DDoS-for-hire empire brought down: Poland arrests 4 administrators, US seizes 9 domains

In the latest blow to the criminal market for distributed denial of service (DDoS)-for-hire services, Polish authorities have arrested four individuals who allegedly ran a network of platforms used to launch thousands of cyberattacks worldwide. The suspects are believed to be behind six separate stresser/booter services that enabled paying customers to flood websites and servers with malicious traffic — knocking them offline for as little as EUR 10.
The now defunct platforms – Cfxapi, Cfxsecurity, neostress, jetstress, quickdown and zapcut – are thought to have facilitated widespread attacks on schools, government services, businesses, and gaming platforms between 2022 and 2025.
The platforms offered slick interfaces that required no technical skills. Users simply entered a target IP address, selected the type and duration of attack, and paid the fee — automating attacks that could overwhelm even well-defended websites.
Global law enforcement response
The arrests in Poland were part of a coordinated international action involving law enforcement authorities in 4 countries, with Europol providing analytical and operational support throughout the investigation.
Dutch authorities have deployed fake booter sites designed to warn users seeking out DDoS-for-hire services, reinforcing the message that those who use these tools are being watched and could face prosecution. Data from booter websites, seized by Dutch law enforcement in data centres in the Netherlands, was shared with international partners, including Poland, contributing to the arrest of the four administrators.
The United States seized 9 domains associated with booter services during the coordinated week of action, continuing its broader campaign against commercialised DDoS platforms.
Germany supported the Polish-led investigation by helping identify one of the suspects and sharing critical intelligence on others.
What are stresser and booter services?
Stresser and booter services offer on-demand cyberattacks, often disguised as tools for legitimate testing but widely used to cause deliberate disruption. These services let users flood a target server or website with enormous volumes of fake traffic, making them inaccessible to real users – a technique known as distributed denial of service.
Unlike traditional botnets, which require the control of large numbers of infected devices, stresser/booter services industrialise DDoS attacks through centralised, rented infrastructure. They are often advertised on underground forums and the dark web, and transactions are typically anonymised.
This coordinated action is part of Operation PowerOFF, an ongoing international law enforcement effort targeting the infrastructure behind DDoS-for-hire activity.

New Best Practices Guide for Securing AI Data Released

CISA, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and international partners released a joint Cybersecurity Information Sheet on AI Data Security: Best Practices for Securing Data Used to Train & Operate AI Systems.

This information sheet highlights the critical role of data security in ensuring the accuracy, integrity, and trustworthiness of AI outcomes. It outlines key risks that may arise from data security and integrity issues across all phases of the AI lifecycle, from development and testing to deployment and operation.

Defense Industrial Bases, National Security Systems owners, federal agencies, and Critical Infrastructure owners and operators are encouraged to review this information sheet and implement the recommended best practices and mitigation strategies to protect sensitive, proprietary, and mission critical data in AI-enabled and machine learning systems. These include adopting robust data protection measures; proactively managing risks; and strengthening monitoring, threat detection, and network defense capabilities.

As AI systems become more integrated into essential operations, organizations must remain vigilant and take deliberate steps to secure the data that powers them.

Primary Mitigations to Reduce Cyber Threats to Operational Technology

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department of Energy (DOE)—hereafter referred to as “the authoring organizations”—are aware of cyber incidents affecting the operational technology (OT) and industrial control systems (ICS) of critical infrastructure entities in the United States. The authoring organizations urge critical infrastructure entities to review and act now to improve their cybersecurity posture against cyber threat activities specifically and intentionally targeting internet connected OT and ICS.
Mitigations
The authoring organizations recommend critical infrastructure asset owners and operators implement the following mitigations[1] to defend against OT cyber threats.
- Remove OT connections to the public internet. OT devices are easy targets when connected to the internet. OT devices lack authentication and authorization methods that are resistant to modern threats and are quickly found by searching for open ports on public IP ranges with search engine tools to target victims with OT components [CPG 2.X].
- Cyber threat actors use simple, repeatable, and scalable toolsets available to anyone with an internet browser. Critical infrastructure entities should identify their public-facing assets and remove unintentional exposure.
- Change default passwords immediately and use strong, unique passwords. Recent analysis of this cyber activity indicates that targeted systems use default or easily guessable (using open source tools) passwords. Changing default passwords is especially important for public-facing internet devices that have the capability to control OT systems or processes [CPG 2.A][CPG 2.B][CPG 2.C].
- Secure remote access to OT networks. Many critical infrastructure entities, or contractors working on their behalf, make risk-based tradeoffs when implementing remote access to OT assets. These tradeoffs deserve careful reevaluation. If remote access is essential, upgrade to a private IP network connection to remove these OT assets from the public internet and use virtual private network (VPN) functionality with a strong password and phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) for user remote access.
- Document and configure remote access solutions to apply principles of least privilege for the specific asset and user role or scope of work [CPG 2.H]. Further, disable dormant accounts.
- Segment IT and OT networks. Segmenting critical systems and introducing a demilitarized zone for passing control data to enterprise logistics reduces the potential impact of cyber threats and reduces the risk of disruptions to essential OT operations [CPG 2.F].
- Practice and maintain the ability to operate OT systems manually. The capability for organizations to revert to manual controls to quickly restore operations is vital in the immediate aftermath of an incident. Business continuity and disaster recovery plans, fail-safe mechanisms, islanding capabilities, software backups, and standby systems should all be routinely tested to ensure safe manual operations in the event of an incident.
The authoring organizations recommend that critical infrastructure organizations regularly communicate with their third-party managed service providers, system integrators, and system manufacturers who may be able to provide system-specific configuration guidance as they work to secure their OT.
- Misconfigurations may be introduced during standard operations, by the system integrator, by a managed service provider, or as part of the default product configuration by the system manufacturer. Working with the relevant groups to address these issues may prevent future unintentional vulnerabilities from being introduced.

Ensuring Compliance with the EU CER Directive: Protecting Critical Fiber Optic Infrastructure

The European Union’s cybersecurity directive (NIS2) became legally binding across all EU member states on October 17, 2024. On the same day, member states were also required to outline measures for implementing the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive, which takes effect in January 2025. Operators of critical fiber optic networks must adapt to ensure compliance.
This article explores how thorough risk analysis, proactive risk-reduction strategies, and continuous effectiveness checks are pivotal to meeting these directives.
Key technologies like fiber integrity monitoring and physical threat detection will be examined, alongside real-world applications in wind farms and pipelines. The article will also outline how these solutions can extend to sectors such as perimeter security, offering actionable insights for operators to strengthen their infrastructure resilience.
Directives Demand Change
The CER Directive has been adopted by the European Union (EU) to enhance the resilience of critical infrastructure and entities that provide essential services. The directive was adopted in December 2022, requiring member states to enact national legislation before coming into effect in October 2024. The previous Critical Infrastructure Directive (2008) is now superseded as the new CER Directive reflects the evolving security landscape characterized by increased cyber threats, climate change impacts, and geopolitical tensions.
To fully address the resilience of those entities that are critical for the proper functioning of the internal market, the directive creates an overarching framework that addresses the resilience of critical entities in respect of all hazards, whether natural or man-made, accidental or intentional.
The directive applies to essential services broadly grouped into 10 key sectors, including energy, transport, banking, health, water supply, and digital infrastructure –ensuring these entities can withstand and recover from a wide range of disruptions. Its scope includes both physical and digital risks, emphasizing a holistic approach to resilience.
Key to the CER Directive is the requirement for member states to identify “critical entities” based on their significance to the functioning of society and the economy. These entities must conduct risk assessments, implement security measures, and report significant incidents to the relevant authorities.
The directive aligns closely with the EU’s Network and Information Security Directive (NIS2), ensuring an integrated approach to both physical and cybersecurity.
NIS2 is the EU-wide legislation on cybersecurity that provides legal requirements to enhance the overall level of cybersecurity within the EU. Coming into force in 2023 (member states had until October 2024 to transpose the directive into law), NIS2 replaces the earlier 2016 rules to reflect increased digitization and evolving cybersecurity threats.
By expanding the scope of the cybersecurity rules to new sectors and entities, NIS2 further improves the resilience and incident response capacities of public and private entities, competent authorities and the EU as a whole.
Among its provisions, NIS2 mandates that member states have a Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) and a competent national network and information systems (NIS) authority. Similar to the CER directive, NIS2 promotes a culture of security across information-centric sectors that are vital for economies and society in general such as energy, transport, water, banking, financial market infrastructures, healthcare and digital infrastructure.
Fiber Optics are Critical to Infrastructure
Clearly, with the nature and amount of data they carry, fiber optic networks must be considered to be critical infrastructure for the purposes of both directives. This means that operators of these networks must embrace new measures and implement comprehensive risk management processes.
Primarily, this involves conducting thorough risk assessments, planning and executing risk-reducing measures, and regularly confirming their effectiveness. Wherever measures are found to be inadequate, additional steps must be taken to minimize any impact upon the economy or society.
Fiber Integrity: The physical integrity of the fiber is of prime importance, along with controlling access to the cable itself. Operators must be able to detect and localize fiber damage and / or breaks, and other incidents that could negatively impact operation. Many operators use an optical network monitoring system on their dark and lit fiber optic links. As well as assessing damage, the ONMSi system can also assess overall fiber health and monitor for degradation over time.
Maintaining fiber integrity also requires operators to restrict access to cables and identify any breaches. For this, passive, maintenance-free sensors are often used to monitor access points, manholes and distribution boxes to alert operators about any access – legitimate or unplanned / unauthorized. This approach to access monitoring can be implemented with the same fiber monitoring system and many consider this to be essential to meet the requirements of the directives.
Threat Detection: Ideally, potential breaches of any critical infrastructure will be detected before the cable is reached. Another area is of interest is physical threat detection for critical infrastructure. This entails real-time detection, notification, and location of threats, third party interference, perimeter intrusions, and anomalies anywhere along the infrastructure.
Fiber optic sensing technologies such as Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) are valuable due to their ability to differentiate between various types of disturbances, such as mechanical or manual digging near cables. Additionally, DAS can be used for virtual fencing or to provide proximity alerts that will detect people or vehicles approaching infrastructure.
DAS technology is essential in ensuring regulatory compliance and operational security, mitigating the risk of accidental damage or deliberate third-party interference by identifying and pinpointing threats.
Besides the physical security, operators must be mindful of data integrity and network availability as well. While fiber optics cannot be ‘eavesdropped’ in the same way that copper cables can, there are still risks to data being disrupted or networks rendered unavailable. For any data network, accurate timing of clock signals and synchronization throughout the network are critical to ensure basic functioning and operation. Any disruption to the Precision Timing Protocol (PTP), or the timing (clock) information it distributes, can lead to data loss, disrupting a network and rendering it unavailable.
Techniques such as high-precision timing analysis and synchronization verification can prevent this loss of data and disruption of the network itself, thus minimizing failure risks and ensuring the reliability of critical communication systems. This verification is crucial for maintaining the integrity of modern communication networks, including 5G.
Critical Infrastructure in Real-Life Scenarios
Renewable energy installations, such as wind farms, are providing an ever-increasing level of electrical power. This will only increase in the future, making these facilities a crucial component of energy infrastructure. Ensuring the reliability and efficient operation of these installations is paramount, and fiber sensing technology is instrumental in day-to-day operation.
Using the unique properties of optical fibers, operators can detect changes in temperature, strain, and acoustic vibration (sound) along the length of a fiber. With these fibers already integrated into the infrastructure of wind farms the structural health and operating conditions can be continuously monitored remotely.
By requirement, turbines are located where wind is consistent – either remote onshore locations or, increasingly, offshore where they have to endure waves, tidal forces, tectonic activity, and corrosive saltwater. In either scenario they are connected to the main national power grid through array cables and export cables which are critical for getting energy to where it is needed. Techniques such as Distributed Strain Sensing (DSS) and Distributed Acoustic Temperature Sensing (DTS), or a combined temperature and strain measurement (DTSS,) monitor changes in strain and temperature to provide valuable data on the structural integrity of these cables, often allowing a repair or remedial action to be effected before a complete failure occurs.
By utilising fiber already embedded into or bonded onto those cables, DSS, DTS or DTSS can be used to monitor cable integrity, detecting issues such as depth of burial changes for underground cables, stress and strain due to movement or icing, mechanical damage, or thermal anomalies. Understanding cable temperature is also critical to optimise cable power transfer, too much power and you risk overheating and potentially melting cables, so operators use DTS to calculate the Real Time Thermal Rating (RTTR) of cables which enables them to maximise/optimise power transfer while preserving the operational life of the cables.
Offshore turbine power cables are also subject to some unique risks such as damage from ship’s anchors or fishing trawlers. Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) can detect threats in the environment around infrastructure, like disturbances caused by fishing gear or ship anchors, providing proximity warnings and identifying potential risks. As this is done in real-time, operators can take immediate action to mitigate the impact, such as intercepting or rerouting vessels or triggering an investigation to identify which vessel was in the areas so that any damage claims can be made against the operator, cable repairs at sea can be a costly thing.
With the continuous data available on the condition of the turbines, cables and other aspects of the power infrastructure, operators can see change as soon as it happens and track any degradations over time. This allows operators to predict when and where maintenance is needed, preventing unexpected failures, reducing downtime and saving the significant costs associated with total failure.
Pipelines are equally critical in transporting energy in the form of a liquid or gas. Given the volatile nature of these substances, ensuring the safety and integrity of pipelines is paramount. Here also, fiber sensing technology offers unparalleled capabilities for real-time monitoring and early detection of potential issues. Recognizing the benefits of this technology, it has become mandatory to include fiber sensing for new pipelines and in some cases retrofitting the technology to existing infrastructure.
By embedding fiber optic cables nearby or attaching them to pipelines, operators can continuously monitor the structural health and operational conditions of these critical assets. A huge advantage of fiber sensing technology is the ability to detect leaks at an early stage using either DAS or DTS depending on what the pipeline is transporting. In some cases, a mix of both is used.
Unlike traditional inspections that require personnel and equipment to be transported to remote and often inhospitable regions, fiber sensing can be performed remotely. Additionally, fiber sensing is less likely to miss a small leak in the way that an engineer could.
Similar to power cables, fiber sensing can monitor any changes to the structural integrity of pipelines due to environmental factors, operational pressures, and aging infrastructure. It can also use DAS to detect unauthorized activities such as digging or tampering, thereby preventing sabotage and theft.
Regular monitoring and maintenance based on fiber sensing data can significantly extend the lifespan of pipelines. By identifying and addressing potential issues early, operators can prevent the deterioration of pipeline materials and ensure their long-term integrity. This proactive approach not only enhances safety but also maximizes the return on investment for pipeline infrastructure.
Conclusion
Fiber sensing technology is continually evolving, with constant innovation enhancing capabilities and increasing sensitivity. Most recently, technologies such as DAS have enabled even greater sensitivity and accuracy in detecting changes along pipelines and cables. Now, operators can differentiate between various types of disturbances, such as vehicle movements, manual versus mechanical digging, and leaks, offering a very comprehensive monitoring solution.
Fiber sensing technology is transforming the way we monitor and maintain remotely located energy infrastructure. Its ability to provide real-time, continuous data on the condition of assets offers significant advantages in terms of safety, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness.
As fiber sensing continues to advance, operators can expect even greater improvements in energy infrastructure monitoring and management thereby ensuring the integrity and longevity of critical infrastructure, safeguarding both the environment and their investments.
Douglas Clague, Solutions Marketing Manager - Fiber Optic Field Test – VIAVI Solutions.

CISA and Partners Issue Fast Flux Cybersecurity Advisory

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) joined the National Security Agency (NSA) and other government and international partners to release a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) that warns organizations, internet service providers (ISPs), and cybersecurity service providers about fast flux enabled malicious activities that consistently evade detection. The CSA also provides recommended actions to defend against fast flux.
An ongoing threat, fast flux networks create resilient adversary infrastructure used to evade tracking and blocking. Such infrastructure can be used for cyberattacks such as phishing, command and control of botnets, and data exfiltration. This advisory provides several techniques that should be implemented for a multi-layered security approach including DNS and internet protocol (IP) blocking and sinkholing; enhanced monitoring and logging; phishing awareness and training for users; and reputational filtering.
 "Threat actors leveraging fast flux techniques remain a threat to government and critical infrastructure organizations. Fast flux makes individual computers in a botnet harder to find and block. A useful solution is to find and block the behavior of fast flux itself,” said CISA Deputy Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity Matt Hartman. “CISA is pleased to join with our government and international partners to provide this important guidance on mitigating and blocking malicious fast flux activity. We encourage organizations to implement the advisory recommendations to reduce risk and strengthen resilience."
The authoring agencies encourage ISPs, cybersecurity service providers and Protective Domain Name System (PDNS) providers to help mitigate this threat by taking proactive steps to develop accurate and reliable fast flux detection analytics and block fast flux activities for their customers.
Additional co-sealers for this joint CSA are Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ).

More than 300 arrests as African countries clamp down on cyber threats

Authorities in seven African countries have arrested 306 suspects and seized 1,842 devices in an international operation targeting cyber attacks and cyber-enabled scams.
The arrests were made as part of Operation Red Card (November 2024 – February 2025) which aims to disrupt and dismantle cross-border criminal networks which cause significant harm to individuals and businesses. In particular, the operation targeted mobile banking, investment and messaging app scams. The cases uncovered during the operation involved more than 5,000 victims.
As part of the crackdown, Nigerian police arrested 130 people, including 113 foreign nationals, for their alleged involvement in cyber-enabled scams such as online casino and investment fraud. The suspects, who converted proceeds to digital assets to conceal their tracks, were recruited from different countries to run the illegal schemes in as many languages as possible. Nigerian authorities have established that some of the people working in the scam centres may also be victims of human trafficking, forced or coerced into criminal activities. Overall, the investigation led to the seizure of 26 vehicles, 16 houses, 39 plots of land and 685 devices.
In a significant case from South Africa, authorities arrested 40 individuals and seized more than 1,000 SIM cards, along with 53 desktops and towers linked to a sophisticated SIM box fraud scheme. This setup, which reroutes international calls as local ones, is commonly used by criminals to carry out large-scale SMS phishing attacks.
In Zambia, officers apprehended 14 suspected members of a criminal syndicate that hacked into victims’ phones. The scam involved sending a message containing a malicious link which, when clicked, installed malware to the device. This allowed hackers to take control of the messaging account, and ultimately the phone, giving them access to banking apps. The hackers were also able to use the victim’s messaging apps to share the malicious link within conversations and groups, enabling the scam to spread.
During the operation, Rwandan authorities arrested 45 members of a criminal network for their involvement in social engineering scams that defrauded victims of over USD 305,000 in 2024 alone. Their tactics included posing as telecommunications employees and claiming fake ‘jackpot’ wins to extract sensitive information and gain access to victims’ mobile banking accounts. Another method involved impersonating an injured family member to ask relatives for financial assistance towards hospital bills. Overall, USD 103,043 was recovered and 292 devices were seized.

Aviation, maritime and telecoms agencies raise alarm over increase in jamming and spoofing of satellite navigation systems

Increasing incidents of interference with aviation, maritime and other satellite telecommunications services mean states must urgently enhance the protection of a critical radio-frequency band, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and International Maritime Organization (IMO) said with “grave concern" in a joint statement.
These cases of harmful interference are in the form of jamming and spoofing that disrupt Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) operating in the frequency bands allocated to the Radio Navigation Satellite Service (RNSS).
Global Navigation Satellite Systems are constellations of Earth-orbiting satellites that provide positioning, navigation and timing services worldwide that are critical for the safety and efficiency of civilian aircraft, maritime vessels, humanitarian assistance vehicles, as well as for time synchronization of telecommunications networks.
"Global Navigation Satellite Systems are critical to our safety on land, at sea and in the air," said ITU Secretary-General Doreen Bogdan-Martin. “Member States should ensure the uninterrupted operation of these systems for everyone's safety and the resilience of essential services that our lives depend on."​
The joint statement cosigned by the three UN agencies requests Members States to:
- protect the RNSS from transmissions that can adversely cause harmful interference degrading, interrupting or misleading signals used for civilian and humanitarian purposes;
- reinforce resilience of the systems which rely on RNSS for navigation, positioning and timing in relation to this type of interference;
- retain sufficient conventional navigation infrastructure for contingency support in case of RNSS outages and misleading signals, and develop mitigation techniques for loss of services;
- increase collaboration between radio regulatory, civil aviation, maritime, defence and enforcement authorities; and
- report cases of harmful interference affecting RNSS to the appropriate telecommunication, aeronautical and maritime authorities, and to the ITU Radiocommunications Bureau, to enable the monitoring of the situation.
“Protecting radiocommunications systems from harmful interference is at the core of ITU's mandate," said Mario Maniewicz, Director of the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau. “We call on our Members to make responsible use of the radiofrequency spectrum, which is a precious, natural and shared resource we rely on for communicating, travelling and working in our daily lives."
Jamming is an unnecessary transmission, or the transmission of superfluous signals, or the transmission of signals without identification.
Spoofing is the broadcast of GNSS-like signals that can cause a GNSS receiver in a vessel or aircraft to calculate erroneous positions and provide false guidance.

Tackling cybercrime: common challenges and legislative solutions identified by Europol and Eurojust

The latest joint report by Europol and Eurojust, Common Challenges in Cybercrime, explores the persistent and emerging issues that hinder cybercrime investigations. This year’s edition not only identifies key obstacles—particularly in the field of digital evidence—but also examines how new legislative measures could help address them.
The report highlights several pressing challenges faced by law enforcement, including the overwhelming volume of digital data, the risk of data loss, and the persistent barriers to accessing critical information due to legal and technical constraints. The increasing use of anonymisation services has further complicated efforts to track criminal activities online.
To help mitigate these challenges, the report explores the impact of new EU legislative tools, such as the e-Evidence Package, the Digital Services Act, and the EU AI Act. These instruments aim to facilitate data access, improve cross-border cooperation, and enhance investigative capabilities. However, their effectiveness will largely depend on how they are implemented and integrated into existing operational strategies.
The report also underscores the value of the strategic cooperation between Europol and Eurojust, highlighting initiatives such as the SIRIUS Project, which has strengthened collaboration in cybercrime investigations. These efforts continue to play a crucial role in helping law enforcement agencies navigate an increasingly complex digital landscape.
While challenges remain, the report emphasises the potential of these new legislative measures to strengthen the fight against cybercrime. Equipping law enforcement with the right tools and ensuring their effective use in investigations will be key to staying ahead of evolving cyber threats.

NSA, CISA, FBI, and International Partners Release Cybersecurity Advisory on “Fast Flux,” a National Security Threat

CISA—in partnership with the National Security Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), and New Zealand’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ)—released joint Cybersecurity Advisory Fast Flux: A National Security Threat (PDF, 841 KB). This advisory warns organizations, internet service providers (ISPs), and cybersecurity service providers of the ongoing threat of fast flux enabled malicious activities and provides guidance on detection and mitigations to safeguard critical infrastructure and national security.

“Fast flux” is a technique used to obfuscate the locations of malicious servers through rapidly changing Domain Name System (DNS) records associated with a single domain name. This threat exploits a gap commonly found in network defenses, making the tracking and blocking of malicious fast flux activities difficult.

The authoring agencies strongly recommend adopting a multi-layered approach to detection and mitigation to reduce risk of compromise by fast flux-enabled threats. Service providers, especially Protective DNS providers (PDNS), should track, share information about, and block fast flux as part of their provided cybersecurity services. Government and critical infrastructure organizations should close this ongoing gap in network defenses by using cybersecurity and PDNS services that block malicious fast flux activity.

MS-ISAC Releases New Report Highlighting the Critical Role of Information Sharing in National Security

MS-ISAC recently released a new report titled “Strengthening Critical Infrastructure,” highlighting the growing cyber threats to critical infrastructure and the essential role of information sharing between state and local government organisations in national security. The report brings awareness to a surge of attacks by nation-state-affiliated and other criminal groups targeting state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) installations that often contribute to undermining public trust.

The unrelenting attacks facing U.S. critical infrastructure, when successful, have significant and costly direct impacts on government services and undermine American’s confidence in the nation’s ability to defend itself. Critical infrastructure underpins nearly all aspects of society and the threats that critical infrastructure faces require a national-level response. MS-ISAC draws awareness to the critical role that SLTT and information sharing organisations play in providing this response in the report:

“Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) provide significant support to many SLTT organisations. For instance, ISACs like WaterISAC and the Electricity ISAC support SLTT organisations in those SLTT sub-sectors as part of the broader water and electricity critical infrastructure sectors, respectively.”

MS-ISAC’s report is very helpful in understanding the relationship between SLTT and information sharing organisations and how these relationships provide a critical service to the various sectors they oversee. In other words, information sharing is critical for the organisations that make up the critical services American citizens rely on.

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