CISA and FBI Publish Joint Advisory on QakBot Infrastructure

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA), Identification and Disruption of QakBot Infrastructure, to help organizations detect and protect against newly identified QakBot-related activity and malware. QakBot—also known as Qbot, Quackbot, Pinkslipbot, and TA570—is responsible for thousands of malware infections globally.

Originally used as a banking trojan to steal banking credentials for account compromise, QakBot—in most cases—was delivered via phishing campaigns containing malicious attachments or links to download the malware, which would reside in memory once on the victim network. QakBot has since grown to deploy multiple types of malware, trojans, and highly-destructive ransomware variants targeting the United States and other global infrastructures, including the Election Infrastructure Subsector, Financial Services, Emergency Services, and Commercial Facilities Sectors.

CISA and FBI urge organizations to implement the recommendations contained within the joint CSA to reduce the likelihood of QakBot-related activity and promote identification of QakBot-facilitated ransomware and malware infections.

Download latest Preliminary Conference Programme Guide for CIPRE

As someone responsible in your organisations for critical assets and/or infrastructure, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Europe is the leading conference that will keep you abreast of the changes in legislation, current threats and latest developments.

Download the Preliminary Conference Programme Guide at www.cipre-expo.com/guide.

What is the new directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities...

The Directive on the Resilience of Critical Entities entered into force on 16 January 2023. Member States have until 17 October 2024 to adopt national legislation to transpose the Directive.

The Directive aims to strengthen the resilience of critical entities against a range of threats, including natural hazards, terrorist attacks, insider threats, or sabotage, as well as public health emergencies.

Are you up to date on this legislation, and do you know what you need to do to be compliant?

Get updated on the NIS2 Directive and what it means to you...

An important discussion will centre around the EU cybersecurity rules introduced in 2016 and updated by the NIS2 Directive that came into force in 2023. It modernised the existing legal framework to keep up with increased digitisation and an evolving cybersecurity threat landscape.

By expanding the scope of the cybersecurity rules to new sectors and entities, it further improves the resilience and incident response capacities of public and private entities, competent authorities and the EU as a whole.

Businesses identified by the Member States as operators of essential services in the above sectors will have to take appropriate security measures and notify relevant national authorities of serious incidents. Key digital service providers, such as search engines, cloud computing services and online marketplaces, will have to comply with the security and notification requirements under the Directive.

What will this mean for you and how can you meet the Directives goals?

Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Europe is Europe's leading discussion that brings together leading stakeholders from industry, operators, agencies and governments to collaborate on securing Europe's critical infrastructures.
The conferences top quality programme looks at these developing themes and help create better understanding of the issues and the threats, to help facilitate the work to develop frameworks, good risk management, strategic planning and implementation.

The packed event themes include:

- Interdependencies and Cascading Effects
- Emerging Threats against CI
- Crisis Management, Coordination & Communication
- Power & Energy Sector Symposium
- Government, Defence & Space Sector Symposium
- Communications Sector Symposium
- Information Technology (CIIP) Sector Symposium
- Transport Sector Symposium
- CBRNE Sector Symposium
- Technologies to Detect and Protect
- Risk Mitigation and Management
- The Insider Threat
- Business Continuity Management
- EU Horizon Projects Overviews

You are invited to be a part of this program, where you can meet, network and learn from the experiences of over 40 expert international speakers, as well as industry colleagues who share the same challenges and goals.

Please join us and the CI industry in the beautiful city of Prague, on 3rd-5th October, for a great programme of discussions that can help you to deliver enhanced security and resilience for your organisation.

Visit www.cipre-expo.com for further details

 

CISA Publishes JCDC Remote Monitoring and Management Systems Cyber Defense Plan

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) published the Cyber Defense Plan for Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM), the first proactive Plan developed by industry and government partners through the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) as part of our 2023 Planning Agenda. This Plan provides a clear roadmap to advance security and resilience of the RMM ecosystem and further specific lines of effort in the National Cyber Strategy to scale public-private collaboration and in the CISA Cybersecurity Strategic Plan to drive adoption of the most impactful security measures.

Organizations across sectors leverage RMM products to gain efficiencies and benefit from scalable services. These same benefits, however, are increasingly targeted by adversaries – from ransomware actors to nation-states – to compromise large numbers of downstream customer organizations. By targeting RMM products, threat actors attempt to evade detection and maintain persistent access, a technique known as living off the land.

Part of our 2023 Planning Agenda, the RMM Cyber Defense Plan provides a clear roadmap to advance security and resilience of this critical ecosystem, including RMM vendors, managed service providers (MSPs), managed security service providers (MSSPs), small and medium sized businesses (SMBs), and critical infrastructure operators. This Plan was developed through a multi-month process that leveraged deep expertise by vendors, operators, agencies, and other stakeholders, and has already resulted in a significant deliverable with publication of our joint advisory on Protecting Against Malicious Use of Remote Monitoring and Management Software.

The RMM Cyber Defense Plan is built on two foundational pillars, operational collaboration and cyber defense guidance, and contains four subordinate lines of effort:

(1) Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Information Sharing: Expand the sharing of cyber threat and vulnerability information between U.S. government and RMM ecosystem stakeholders.

(2) Enduring RMM Operational Community: Implement mechanisms for an enduring RMM operational community that will continue to mature scaled security efforts.

(3) End-User Education: Develop and enhance end-user education and cybersecurity guidance to advance adoption of strong best practices, a collaborative effort by CISA, interagency partners and other RMM ecosystem stakeholders.

(4) Amplification: Leverage available lines of communication to amplify relevant advisories and alerts within the RMM ecosystem.

“As envisioned by Congress and the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, JCDC Cyber Defense Plans are intended to bring together diverse stakeholders across the cybersecurity ecosystem to understand systemic risks and develop shared, actionable solutions. The RMM Cyber Defense Plan demonstrates the criticality of this work and the importance of both deep partnership and proactive planning in addressing systemic risks facing our country,” said Eric Goldstein,CISA Executive Assistant Director for Cybersecurity. “These planning efforts are dependent on trusted collaboration with our partners, and this Plan was a true partnership with the RMM community, industry and interagency partners that contributed time and effort towards this important work. The collaboration established to develop this plan has already achieved several accomplishments for RMM stakeholders and ecosystem. As the JCDC leads the execution of this plan, we are confident that this public-private collaboration in the RMM ecosystem will further reduce risk to our nation’s critical infrastructure.”

Your latest issue of Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience News has arrived

Please find here your downloadable copy of the Summer 2023 issue of Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience News for the latest views and news at www.cip-association.org/CIPRNews.

- The CNI / Crowded Places Security Debate
- Beyond Physical Protection
- Hybrid Threats
– A Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem
- Artificial Intelligence and Cybersecurity Research
- Resilience in action
- An Interview with EU-CIP Project
- IBM Report: Half of Breached Organizations Unwilling to Increase Security Spend Despite Soaring Breach Costs
- Using the EU Space Programme for disaster risk management in Hungary
- An Interview with TIEMS
- Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience Europe Preview
- Agency and Industry News

Download your Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience News at www.cip-association.org/CIPRNews

Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience News is the official magazine of the International Association of Critical Infrastructure Protection Professionals (IACIPP), a non-profit organisation that provides a platform for sharing good practices, innovation and insights from Industry leaders and operators alongside academia and government and law enforcement agencies.

#CriticalInfrastructureProtection #CriticalInfrastructure #cybersecurity #help2protect #cisa #ciprna #cipre #resilience #cooperation #emergencymanagement #emergencyresponse #crisismanagement #businesscontinuity #crisisresponse #mitigation

CISA, NSA, and NIST Publish Factsheet on Quantum Readiness

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) released a joint factsheet, Quantum-Readiness: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC), to inform organizations—especially those that support Critical Infrastructure—of the impacts of quantum capabilities, and to encourage the early planning for migration to post-quantum cryptographic standards by developing a Quantum-Readiness Roadmap.

CISA, NSA, and NIST urge organizations to review the joint factsheet and to begin preparing now by creating quantum-readiness roadmaps, conducting inventories, applying risk assessments and analysis, and engaging vendors. For more information and resources related to CISA’s PQC work, visit Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative.

CISA Releases Infrastructure Resilience Planning Framework Launchpoint

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) releases the Infrastructure Resilience Planning Framework (IRPF) Launchpoint, a supplemental resource developed to help prospective users of the IRPF quickly navigate IRPF guidance and concepts based on their specific needs.

This self-appraisal tool helps users contemplate their community’s resilience goals and start developing an approach to incorporating critical infrastructure resilience into their planning activities by pointing them to specific IRPF guidance, resources, and templates that might be most relevant and valuable to them.

“The IRPF Launchpoint is a great resource created by our Resilience Services Branch that provides SLTT and regional planners with insights on how best to apply the Infrastructure Resilience Planning Framework to meet their specific needs,” said Dr. David Mussington, Executive Assistant Director for Infrastructure Security. “As one of many resilience resources within CISA, the new IRPF Launchpoint tool will guide users to specific resources they can employ in planning for infrastructure to reduce the risk of disruptions to their communities.”

Infrastructure is the backbone of communities, providing not only critical services, but also the means for health, safety, and economic growth. CISA’s IRPF provides flexible guidance for state, local, tribal, territorial, and regional planners on enhancing community resilience by addressing critical infrastructure dependencies in their existing planning efforts.

Spanish EU Council Presidency: CoESS and APROSER make proposals for a future-oriented, more resilient, European Union

On 01 July 2023, Spain took over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU. It will thereby be responsible to lead the work in Brussels on important matters such as negotiations on the EU Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act and initiatives in the context of the EU Year on Skills.

In a Joint Statement, CoESS and APROSER declare the commitment of the European security industry to support the efforts of the Spanish Presidency on a large range of matters impacting not only the security services, but public security overall.

The timing of the Spanish Presidency comes at a particularly decisive stage. First, EU lawmakers will have to find agreement on a large range of open dossiers before the European elections in 2024, notably the EU AI Act. At the same time, European businesses and societies are confronted with a range of challenges, such as labour shortages and increasing threats to the protection of Critical Infrastructure and supply chains – to name only a few.

In their Joint Statement, the representatives of the European and Spanish private security industry, CoESS and APROSER, confirm their commitment to support the Spanish Presidency in its efforts to build a more future-oriented and resilient EU and make respective proposals for the way forward. These are grouped along four key messages:

- Recognising the value of private security services to European citizens and economy
- Adapt legislation to realities in a changing security landscape
- Public security empowered through qualified workers
- Enforce the provision of high-quality security services to European citizens

Important recommendations include the hosting of a private security roundtable in Brussels, principles of human-centred AI and legal certainty in the context of the future EU AI Act, and a call for a revision of the EU Public Procurement Directives.

ICS regulations, standards and directives improve cybersecurity in OT environments, though limitations prevail

Increasing instances of cybersecurity threats, geopolitical instability, and rising cyber insurance premiums call upon operational environments to strengthen and safeguard by implementing ICS regulations, standards, and directives. Weaving these measures into the organizational framework helps improve security posture, enhance resilience against cyber threats, minimize cyber risks, protect assets and operations, and safeguard public safety and national security while establishing a common baseline for cybersecurity practices.

Federal agencies around the world have recognized the importance of securing critical infrastructure systems and stepped up efforts to bolster cybersecurity measures in OT (operational technology) environments. These regulations outline specific requirements that organizations must follow regarding the management and protection of their OT assets. Compliance with these measures is mandatory and failure to comply can result in penalties or loss of licensing.

Assigning directives by regulatory bodies or industry-specific organizations also helps provide guidance on specific aspects of cybersecurity for OT environments. These measures serve as a roadmap for organizations to enhance their security posture and align their practices with industry best practices.

Standards are set by international organizations and industry consortiums to define best practices, frameworks, and technical specifications for securing OT environments. Standards such as ISO 27001, IEC 62443, IEC 63452, and NIST SP 800-82 provide organizations with a structured approach to implementing security controls, risk management, and incident response processes in OT environments. Compliance with these standards helps organizations demonstrate their commitment to cybersecurity and provides a benchmark for measuring their security posture.

Industrial Cyber contacted cybersecurity executives to assess the adequacy of existing regulations, standards, and directives in addressing Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) attacks, nation-state hackers, and insider threats in OT/ICS environments. They also analyze how they contribute to building resilience and business continuity in OT environments and the critical infrastructure sector.

“CISA is at its core a partnership agency and our relationship with critical infrastructure entities is based on a voluntary collaboration and trust,” Eric Goldstein, executive assistant director for cybersecurity at the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), told Industrial Cyber. “In certain cases, CISA supports regulatory agencies in developing outcome-oriented requirements that appropriately incentivize adoption of the most effective security controls, including with agencies like TSA, EPA, and the U.S. Coast Guard.”

He added that in all cases, regulatory requirements do not replace the foundational value of voluntary operational collaboration to support shared security outcomes between the government and the private sector.

“The relative pervasiveness of RaaS and other intrusions into critical infrastructure demonstrate that our current regimes are insufficient to ensuring that critical infrastructure owners and operators have taken the necessary steps to secure their environments,” Mark Bristow, director of MITRE’s Cyber Infrastructure Protection Innovation Center (CIPIC), told Industrial Cyber. “This is particularly frustrating in the case of RaaS where financially motivated adversaries are often looking for the ‘low hanging fruit’ with vulnerabilities that are well understood and can be mitigated but are not providing ample examples of ransomware against our CI entities. Some industries already have regulations for cybersecurity, such as the NERC CIP regulations.”

Full story at Industrial Cyber >>

CyberSentry Program Launches Webpage

It should come as no surprise that our nation’s critical infrastructure is under concerted threat from malicious cyber actors.

To illustrate, just recently, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s 2023 Threat Assessment stated that “China almost certainly is capable of launching cyber-attacks that could disrupt critical infrastructure services within the United States, including against oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems” and that “Russia is particularly focused on improving its ability to target critical infrastructure, including underwater cables and industrial control systems, in the United States as well as in allied and partner countries, because compromising such infrastructure improves and demonstrates its ability to damage infrastructure during a crisis.”

Facing such a challenging threat environment, we must focus our efforts on a two-pronged strategy of defense – on driving adoption of strong cybersecurity measures, and on ensuring effective visibility into cyber threats targeting our nation’s critical infrastructure.

The second line of effort, in particular, is what I want to talk about today.

Right now, we are able to achieve a portion of this visibility by partnering with critical infrastructure organizations and cybersecurity companies, forging and maintaining crucial relationships with our partners for the betterment of our nation.

But for some of the nation’s most critical entities, we need to do more. And that leads us to CyberSentry.

We can distill down CyberSentry’s mission to this – through unique partnerships with industry, CISA is able to supply commercial detection capabilities that provide three key benefits:

- Enables the operational use of sensitive information prior to broader dissemination to the cybersecurity community

- Allows CISA’s analysts to correlate threat activity targeting multiple critical infrastructure entities and understand evolving campaigns

- Provides participating entities with access to their own CyberSentry dashboard, enabling integration into the partner’s cyber operations.

CyberSentry is governed by an agreement between CISA and voluntarily participating critical infrastructure partners. CyberSentry technology supports sensing and monitoring for information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) networks. CyberSentry has added significant value to both CISA’s national mission and to our partners’ enterprise cybersecurity efforts.

Recent successes include:

- Infected OT Equipment: CyberSentry discovered an infection on a partner’s Human Machine Interface (HMI) equipment that had not been properly patched and secured. CISA analysts quickly notified the partner about the issue and offered guidance on preventive techniques for the future.

- Unintentional Exposure: CyberSentry tools spotted cleartext authentication occurring on a partner’s network, and further investigation revealed that a misconfiguration had caused the issue. A detailed report was provided to the partner, including specific guidance on remediating the situation.

- Private Sector Coordination: During the Colonial Pipeline disruption, CISA analysts coordinated closely with its pipeline partners to share information and monitor for adversary activity.

- SolarWinds Response: CyberSentry data helped to quickly identify partners affected by the SolarWinds supply chain compromise. All impacted partners were notified, and the program worked closely and expediently with these partners to confirm remediation of the threat.

- Identification of Malicious Activity: On multiple occasions, CISA analysts identified possible malicious activity at partner sites and worked with affected partners to identify the root causes of activity.

- Malware Discovery: CyberSentry tools quickly discovered and identified malware in a partner’s IT network. Working with the partner, CISA analysts were able to locate the infected device so the partner could remove it from the network and verify that the threat was contained.

- Attacker Exfiltration Detected: CyberSentry discovered that an attacker was actively exfiltrating information. CyberSentry worked with the partner to identify information that had been exfiltrated. After conferring with CyberSentry analysts, the partner was able to isolate infected systems that same evening, eliminating the threat.

CISA is looking to partner with a select number of additional Critical Infrastructure organizations who operate systems supporting National Critical Functions – functions so vital to the United States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on our Nation.

As malicious cyber activity continues to evolve, and nation state actors continue to aggressively target National Critical Functions, CyberSentry’s capabilities and critical partnerships directly enhance CISA’s goal of a stronger collective defense for our Nation.

For more information visit our CyberSentry webpage.

Author: Jermaine Roebuck, Associate Director for Threat Hunting

Ransomware Accounts for 54% of Cybersecurity Threats

The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) released its first cyber threat landscape for the health sector. The report found that ransomware accounts for 54% of cybersecurity threats in the health sector.

The comprehensive analysis maps and studies cyberattacks, identifying prime threats, actors, impacts, and trends for a period of over 2 years, providing valuable insights for the healthcare community and policy makers. The analysis is based on a total of 215 publicly reported incidents in the EU and neighbouring countries.

Executive Director of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), Juhan Lepassaar, said: “A high common level of cybersecurity for the healthcare sector in the EU is essential to ensure health organisations can operate in the safest way. The rise of the covid-19 pandemic showed us how we critically depend on health systems. What I consider as a wake-up call confirmed we need to get a clear view of the risks, the attack surface and the vulnerabilities specific to the sector. Access to incident reporting data must therefore be facilitated to better visualise and comprehend our cyber threat environment and identify the appropriate mitigation measures we need to implement.”

The findings

The report reveals a concerning reality of the challenges faced by the EU health sector during the reporting period.

- Widespread incidents. The European health sector experienced a significant number of incidents, with healthcare providers accounting for 53% of the total incidents. Hospitals, in particular, bore the brunt, with 42% of incidents reported. Additionally, health authorities, bodies and agencies (14%), and the pharmaceutical industry (9%) were targeted.
- Ransomware and data breaches. Ransomware emerged as one of the primary threats in the health sector (54% of incidents). This trend is seen as likely to continue. Only 27% of surveyed organisations in the health sector have a dedicated ransomware defence programme. Driven by financial gain, cybercriminals extort both health organisations and patients, threatening to disclose data, personal or sensitive in nature. Patient data, including electronic health records, were the most targeted assets (30%). Alarmingly, nearly half of all incidents (46%) aimed to steal or leak health organisations' data.
- Impact and lessons learned by the COVID-19 Pandemic. It is essential to note that the reporting period coincided with a significant portion of the COVID-19 pandemic era, during which the healthcare sector became a prime target for attackers. Financially motivated threat actors, driven by the value of patient data, were responsible for the majority of attacks (53%). The pandemic saw multiple instances of data leakage from COVID-19-related systems and testing laboratories in various EU countries. Insiders and poor security practices, including misconfigurations, were identified as primary causes of these leaks. The incidents serve as a stark reminder of the importance of robust cybersecurity practices, particularly in times of urgent operational needs.
- Vulnerabilities in Healthcare Systems. Attacks on healthcare supply chains and service providers resulted in disruptions or losses to health organisations (7%). Such types of attacks are expected to remain significant in the future, given the risks posed by vulnerabilities in healthcare systems and medical devices. A recent study by ENISA revealed that healthcare organisations reported the highest number of security incidents related to vulnerabilities in software or hardware, with 80% of respondents citing vulnerabilities as the cause of more than 61% of their security incidents.
- Geopolitical Developments and DDoS Attacks. Geopolitical developments and hacktivist activity led to a surge in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks by pro-Russian hacktivist groups against hospitals and health authorities in early 2023, accounting for 9% of total incidents. While this trend is expected to continue, the actual impact of these attacks remains relatively low.
- The incidents examined in the report had significant consequences for health organisations, primarily resulting in breaches or theft of data (43%) disrupted healthcare services (22%) and disrupted services not related to healthcare (26%). The report also highlights the financial losses incurred, with the median cost of a major security incident in the health sector estimated at €300,000 according to the ENISA NIS Investment 2022 study.
- Patient safety emerges as a paramount concern for the health community, given potential delays in triage and treatment caused by cyber incidents.

New report from the NIS Cooperation Group

The NIS Cooperation Group releases today its report on “Threats and risk management in the health sector – Under the NIS Directive”. As a first assessment on the measures currently in place, the study sheds light on the different cybersecurity challenges in risk mitigation faced by the EU health sector. Together with relevant threat taxonomies and cyber incident data, the report discloses business continuity and mitigation recommendations to limit the likelihood and impacts of a cyber related incident.

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