CISA Warns of Hurricane/Typhoon-Related Scams

The Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) urges users to remain on alert for malicious cyber activity following a natural disaster such as a hurricane or typhoon, as attackers target potential disaster victims by leveraging social engineering tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Social engineering TTPs include phishing attacks that use email or malicious websites to solicit personal information by posing as a trustworthy organization, notably as charities providing relief. Exercise caution in handling emails with hurricane/typhoon-related subject lines, attachments, or hyperlinks to avoid compromise. In addition, be wary of social media pleas, texts, or door-to-door solicitations related to severe weather events.

CISA encourages users to review the Federal Trade Commission’s Staying Alert to Disaster-related Scams and Before Giving to a Charity, and CISA’s Using Caution with Email Attachments and Tips on Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks to avoid falling victim to malicious attacks.

Nuclear Security: DOE Should Take Actions to Fully Implement Insider Threat Program

The theft of nuclear material and the compromise of information could have devastating consequences. Threats can come from external adversaries or from "insiders," including employees or visitors with trusted access. In 2014, DOE established its Insider Threat Program to integrate its policies, procedures, and resources. The program also coordinates analysis, response, and mitigation actions among DOE organizations.

The House report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2022 includes a provision for GAO to review DOE's efforts to address insider threats with respect to the nuclear security enterprise. This report examines (1) the extent to which DOE has implemented required standards to protect the nuclear security enterprise from insider threats and (2) the factors that have affected DOE's ability to fully implement its Insider Threat Program.

GAO reviewed the minimum standards and best practices for federal insider threat programs, DOE documentation, and four assessments by independent reviewers. GAO also interviewed DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration officials and contractors.

The Department of Energy has several programs to ensure proper access to and handling of the nation's nuclear weapons and related information. DOE started a program in 2014 to further protect against insider threats from employees, contractors, and trusted visitors.

But as of 2023, DOE hasn't fully implemented the program. For example, DOE doesn't ensure that employees are trained to identify and report potential insider threats. Also, the agency hasn't clearly defined contractors' responsibilities for this program.

DOE changed the program's leadership in February 2023, but there's more to do. We recommended ways to improve the program.

The Department of Energy (DOE) has not implemented all required measures for its Insider Threat Program more than 8 years after DOE established it in 2014, according to multiple independent assessments. Specifically, DOE has not implemented seven required measures for its Insider Threat Program, even after independent reviewers made nearly 50 findings and recommendations to help DOE fully implement its program (see fig. for examples). DOE does not formally track or report on its actions to implement them. Without tracking and reporting on its actions to address independent reviewers' findings and recommendations, DOE cannot ensure that it has fully addressed identified program deficiencies.

Examples of Selected Recommendations from Independent Assessments of DOE's Insider Threat Program

DOE has not fully implemented its Insider Threat Program due to multiple factors.

- DOE has not integrated program responsibilities. DOE has not effectively integrated Insider Threat Program responsibilities. Instead, DOE divided significant responsibilities for its program between two offices. Specifically, the program's senior official resides within the security office, while operational control for insider threat incident analysis and response resides within the Office of Counterintelligence—a part of the organization with its own line of reporting to the Secretary of Energy. Without better integrating insider threat responsibilities between these offices, DOE's insider threat program will continue to face significant challenges that preclude it from having an effective or fully operational program.

- DOE has not identified and assessed resource needs. DOE has not identified and assessed the human, financial, and technical resources needed to fully implement its Insider Threat Program. Program funding identified in DOE's budget does not account for all program responsibilities. For example, DOE's budget does not include dedicated funding for its contractor-run nuclear weapons production and research sites to carry out their responsibilities for implementing the program. Unless DOE identifies and assesses the resources needed to support the Insider Threat Program, it will be unable to fully ensure that components are equipped to respond to insider threat concerns, potentially creating vulnerabilities in the program.

CISA and Partners Release Cybersecurity Advisory Guidance detailing PRC state-sponsored actors evading detection by “Living off the Land”

The Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) joined the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and international partners in releasing a joint cybersecurity advisory highlighting recently discovered activities conducted by a People’s Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber threat actor.

This advisory highlights how PRC cyber actors use techniques called “living off the land” to evade detection by using built-in networking administration tools to compromise networks and conduct malicious activity. This enables the cyber actor to blend in with routine Windows system and network activities, limit activity and data captured in default logging configurations, and avoid endpoint detection and response (EDR) products that could alert to the introduction of third-party applications on the host or network. Private sector partners have identified that this activity affects networks across U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, and the authoring agencies believe the actor could apply the same techniques against these and other sectors worldwide.

The authoring agencies have identified potential indicators associated with these techniques. To hunt for this activity, CISA and partners encourage network defenders to use the actor’s commands and detection signatures provided in this advisory. CISA and partners further encourage network defenders to view the indicators of compromise (IOCs) and mitigations summaries to detect this activity.

Cyber Agencies and Allies Partner to Identify Russian Snake Malware Infrastructure Worldwide

The National Security Agency (NSA) and several partner agencies have identified infrastructure for Snake malware—a sophisticated Russian cyberespionage tool—in over 50 countries worldwide.

To assist network defenders in detecting Snake and any associated activity, the agencies are publicly releasing the joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA), “Hunting Russian Intelligence “Snake” Malware” today.

The agencies, which include the NSA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), Canadian Cyber Security Centre (CCCS), United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK), Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), and New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ) attribute Snake operations to a known unit within Center 16 of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). The international coalition has identified Snake malware infrastructure across North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Australia, including the United States and Russia.

“Russian government actors have used this tool for years for intelligence collection,” said Rob Joyce, NSA Director of Cybersecurity. “Snake infrastructure has spread around the world. The technical details will help many organizations find and shut down the malware globally.”

Malicious cyber actors used Snake to access and exfiltrate sensitive international relations documents, as well as other diplomatic communications, through a victim in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country.

In the U.S., the FSB has victimized industries including education institutions, small businesses, and media organizations. Critical infrastructure sectors, such as local government, finance, manufacturing, and telecommunications, have also been impacted.

Typically, Snake malware is deployed to external-facing infrastructure nodes on a network. From there, it uses other tools, and techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) on the internal network to conduct additional exploitation operations.

Reimagining Gunshot Detection for Enhanced Community Safety

New portable system employs two methods of detection for increased accuracy and reduced false positives.

New and improved gunshot detection technology will soon make American communities of all sizes safer. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and its industry partner Shooter Detection Systems (SDS) developed SDS Outdoor, a gunshot detection system that builds on existing SDS technology to deliver new capabilities that significantly improve the response and management of outdoor shootings.

Among these new capabilities are portability and ease of system set up at any location, two-source detection—sound and flash—to confirm a gunshot, real-time alerts that provide near-instant situational awareness to law enforcement and emergency medical responders, and enhanced data recording that aids apprehension and conviction of alleged shooters.

Portability allows the system to be set up practically anywhere, including near outdoor events, and a single person can install it. Additionally, the enhanced system tells law enforcement when and where a gunshot originates, cutting response times dramatically and providing police officers actionable information—for example, data that helps them to determine if there is a single shooter or multiple shooters. Agencies can then use that information to coordinate resource response and counter an active threat.

“It takes about two to three minutes for an individual to call 911 after a gunshot. Gunshot detection technology cuts that time in half and sends a notification to local law enforcement. Police could then dispatch a unit quicker to either stop the incident that's occurring or to assist in preventing any lives being taken,” said Wilhelm Thomas, officer with the New York Police Department’s (NYPD) Counterterrorism Division. “If we're there first, we can lock down the scene. This will provide security for the emergency medical services (EMS) and thus help prevent the loss of more lives.”

Although gunshot detection technology is currently in use, it can only be installed at fixed locations. For outdoor public events, portable gunshot detection technology can add another layer of security to already installed security systems like cameras.

“This system does not prevent gunshots. It detects an ongoing shooting to help first responders get there faster,” said Anthony Caracciolo, S&T program manager for First Responder Technology. “The more details officers have about an incident, the quicker they can identify and eliminate the threat, and EMS can tend injured victims safely.”

More than two years ago, S&T’s First Responder Resource Group set out to extend gunshot detection capabilities to locations that do not support fixed deployments, such as open areas where large crowds may gather temporarily. Since then, the project has progressed into prototype design, gathering opinions from first responders, and, most recently, a November 2022 Operational Field Assessment (OFA) led by S&T’s National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL).

“We started this project because most existing gunshot detection technologies come with limitations, and they may also trigger false alarms,” said Caracciolo. “An outdoor mobile detector that can be easily deployed in the field for a concert or other outdoor event is needed.”
Detecting gunshots almost instantly

SDS Outdoor has several interesting added features. For starters, one to two people can transport and install the system. Also, the tech delivers critical intelligence about an outdoor shooting incident almost instantaneously to first responders. Moreover, it dramatically reduces false-positive alerts.

“Unlike other detection systems, which mostly rely just on acoustics, our indoor gunshot detection system pairs two types of sensors—for the firearm’s infrared flash and acoustic bang—to get the false-alert rate way down,” said Richard Onofrio, SDS’ managing director. “We've applied that same concept to this development where we've increased the coverage area considerably.”

Prior to an outdoor event, officers can map out placement locations, install the system in minutes, and select the response agencies whom SDS Outdoor will alert if a shooting occurs.

As a plus, the gunshot detection tech’s alerting software integrates with the existing platforms used by first responders, including security cameras and dispatch systems. If internet is unavailable at an event site—no problem! The tech can communicate with the software application directly in more of a ‘local only’ mode.

CISA and Partners Release BianLian Ransomware Cybersecurity Advisory

CISA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC) have released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) with known BianLian ransomware and data extortion group technical details. Microsoft and Sophos contributed to the advisory.
To reduce the likelihood and impact of BianLian and other ransomware incidents, CISA encourages organizations to implement mitigations recommended in this advisory. Mitigations align with the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs) developed by CISA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

Standardisation of Cybersecurity for Artificial Intelligence

The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) publishes an assessment of standards for the cybersecurity of AI and issues recommendations to support the implementation of upcoming EU policies on Artificial Intelligence (AI).

This report focuses on the cybersecurity aspects of AI, which are integral to the European legal framework regulating AI, proposed by the European Commission last year dubbed as the “AI Act“.

What is Artificial Intelligence?

The draft AI Act provides a definition of an AI system as “software developed with one or more (…) techniques (…) for a given set of human-defined objectives, that generates outputs such as content, predictions, recommendations, or decisions influencing the environments they interact with.” In a nutshell, these techniques mainly include: machine learning resorting to methods such as deep learning, logic, knowledge-based and statistical approaches.

It is indeed essential for the allocation of legal responsibilities under a future AI framework to agree on what falls into the definition of an 'AI system'.

However, the exact scope of an AI system is constantly evolving both in the legislative debate on the draft AI Act, as well in the scientific and standardisation communities.

Although broad in contents, this report focuses on machine learning (ML) due to its extensive use across AI deployments. ML has come under scrutiny with respect to vulnerabilities particularly impacting the cybersecurity of an AI implementation.

AI cybersecurity standards: what’s the state of play?

As standards help mitigate risks, this study unveils existing general-purpose standards that are readily available for information security and quality management in the context of AI. In order to mitigate some of the cybersecurity risks affecting AI systems, further guidance could be developed to help the user community benefit from the existing standards on AI.

This suggestion has been based on the observation concerning the software layer of AI. It follows that what is applicable to software could be applicable to AI. However, it does not mean the work ends here. Other aspects still need to be considered, such as:

  • a system-specific analysis to cater for security requirements deriving from the domain of application;
  • standards to cover aspects specific to AI, such as the traceability of data and testing procedures.

Further observations concern the extent to which the assessment of compliance with security requirements can be based on AI-specific horizontal standards; furthermore, the extent to which this assessment can be based on vertical/sector specific standards calls for attention.

Key recommendations include:

  • Resorting to a standardised AI terminology for cybersecurity;
  • Developing technical guidance on how existing standards related to the cybersecurity of software should be applied to AI;
  • Reflecting on the inherent features of ML in AI. Risk mitigation in particular should be considered by associating hardware/software components to AI; reliable metrics; and testing procedures;
  • Promoting the cooperation and coordination across standards organisations’ technical committees on cybersecurity and AI so that potential cybersecurity concerns (e.g., on trustworthiness characteristics and data quality) can be addressed in a coherent manner.

Regulating AI: what is needed?

As for many other pieces of EU legislation, compliance with the draft AI Act will be supported by standards. When it comes to compliance with the cybersecurity requirements set by the draft AI Act, additional aspects have been identified. For example, standards for conformity assessment, in particular related to tools and competences, may need to be further developed. Also, the interplay across different legislative initiatives needs to be further reflected in standardisation activities – an example of this is the proposal for a regulation on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements, referred to as the “Cyber Resilience Act”.

Building on the report and other desk research as well as input received from experts, ENISA is currently examining the need for and the feasibility of an EU cybersecurity certification scheme on AI. ENISA is therefore engaging with a broad range of stakeholders including industry, ESOs and Member States, for the purpose of collecting data on AI cybersecurity requirements, data security in relation to AI, AI risk management and conformity assessment.

ENISA advocated the importance of standardisation in cybersecurity today, at the RSA Conference in San Francisco in the ‘Standards on the Horizon: What Matters Most?’ in a panel comprising the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

CISA and Partners Disclose Snake Malware Threat From Russian Cyber Actors

CISA and partners released a joint advisory for a sophisticated cyber espionage tool used by Russian cyber actors. Hunting Russian Intelligence “Snake” Malware provides technical descriptions of the malware’s host architecture and network communications, and mitigations to help detect and defend against this threat.


The Snake implant is considered the most sophisticated cyber espionage tool designed and used by Center 16 of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) for long-term intelligence collection on sensitive targets. To conduct operations using this tool, the FSB created a covert peer-to-peer (P2P) network of numerous Snake-infected computers worldwide. Many systems in this P2P network serve as relay nodes which route disguised operational traffic to and from Snake implants on the FSB’s ultimate targets. Snake’s custom communications protocols employ encryption and fragmentation for confidentiality and are designed to hamper detection and collection efforts.

CISA has identified Snake infrastructure in over 50 countries across North America, South America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Australia, to include the United States and Russia itself. Although Snake uses infrastructure across all industries, its targeting is purposeful and tactical in nature. Globally, the FSB has used Snake to collect sensitive intelligence from high-priority targets, such as government networks, research facilities, and journalists. As one example, FSB actors used Snake to access and exfiltrate sensitive international relations documents, as well as other diplomatic communications, from a victim in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country. Within the United States, the FSB has victimized industries including education, small businesses, and media organizations, as well as critical infrastructure sectors including government facilities, financial services, critical manufacturing, and communications.

This Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) provides background on Snake’s attribution to the FSB and detailed technical descriptions of the implant’s host architecture and network communications. This CSA also addresses a recent Snake variant that has not yet been widely disclosed. The technical information and mitigation recommendations in this CSA are provided to assist network defenders in detecting Snake and associated activity. For more information on FSB and Russian state-sponsored cyber activity, please see the joint advisory Russian State-Sponsored and Criminal Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure and CISA’s Russia Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories webpage.

CISA urges organizations to review the advisory for more information and apply the recommended mitigations and detection guidance.

CISA Urges Organizations to Incorporate the FCC Covered List Into Risk Management Plans

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) maintains a Covered List of communications equipment and services that have been determined by the U.S. government to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons to national security pursuant to the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019.

As the 6th annual National Supply Chain Integrity Month concludes, CISA reminds all critical infrastructure owners and operators to take necessary steps in securing the nation’s most critical supply chains. CISA urges organizations to incorporate the Covered List into their supply chain risk management efforts, in addition to adopting recommendations listed in Defending Against Software Supply Chain Attacks—a joint CISA and NIST resource that provides guidance on using NIST’s Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) framework to identify, assess, and mitigate risks. All critical infrastructure organizations are also urged to enroll in CISA’s free Vulnerability Scanning service for assistance in identifying vulnerable or otherwise high-risk devices such as those on FCC’s Covered List.

To learn more about CISA’s supply chain efforts and to view resources, visit

NERC files report evaluating the CIP-014 Reliability Standard with FERC

The Commission directed NERC to evaluate whether the physical security protection requirements in NERC’s Reliability Standards are adequate to address the risks associated with physical attacks on BPS Facilities. Specifically, FERC directed NERC to conduct a study evaluating the following: (1) the adequacy of the Applicability criteria set forth in the Physical Security Reliability Standard; (2) the adequacy of the required risk assessment set forth in the Physical Security Reliability Standard; and (3) whether a minimum level of physical security protections should be required for all BPS substations and their associated primary control centers.

The purpose of the CIP-014 Reliability Standard is to “identify and protect Transmission stations and Transmission substations, and their associated primary control centers, that if rendered inoperable or damaged as a result of a physical attack could result in instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.”2 The standard requires applicable Transmission Owners (“TOs”) to perform periodic risk assessments of their applicable transmission stations and transmission substations (hereinafter collectively referred to as “substations”) to identify which of their applicable substations are “critical” to BPS reliability (which, for purposes of CIP-014, is whether instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading would result if the substation were damaged or rendered inoperable). The TO must then perform an evaluation of the potential physical security threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to each of their “critical” substations and develop and implement a documented physical security plan to address those threats and vulnerabilities. Additionally, for each primary control center that operationally controls an identified substation, the applicable Transmission Operator (“TOP”) must perform an evaluation of the potential physical security threats and vulnerabilities of a physical attack to that control center and develop and implement a documented physical security plan to address those threats and vulnerabilities.

As discussed within this report, NERC finds that the objective of CIP-014 appropriately focuses limited industry resources on risks to the reliable operation of the BPS associated with physical security incidents at the most critical facilities. Based on studies using available data, NERC finds that the CIP-014 Applicability criteria is meeting that objective and is broad enough to capture the subset of applicable facilities that TOs should identify as “critical” pursuant to the risks assessment mandated by Requirement R1. NERC did not find evidence that an expansion of the Applicability criteria would identify additional substations that would qualify as “critical” substations under the CIP- 014 Requirement R1 risk assessment. Accordingly, at this time, NERC is not recommending expansion of the CIP-014 Applicability criteria.

NERC acknowledges, however, that supplementary data3 could show that additional substation configurations would warrant assessment under CIP-014. Accordingly, NERC plans to continue evaluating the adequacy of the Applicability criteria in meeting the objective of CIP-014. Following issuance of this report, NERC will work with FERC staff to hold a technical conference to, among other things, identify the type of substation configurations that should be studied to determine whether any additional substations should be included in the Applicability criteria. The technical conference would also help establish data needs for conducting those studies

NERC finds, however, that the language in Requirement R1 of CIP-014 should be refined to ensure that entities conduct effective risk assessments of their applicable substations. Information from ERO Enterprise Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program (“CMEP”) activities indicates that while the overall objective of the CIP-014 Requirement R1 risk assessment is sound, there are inconsistent approaches to performing the risk assessment. The ERO Enterprise observed that, in certain instances, registered entities failed to provide sufficient technical studies or justification for study decisions resulting in noncompliance. NERC finds that the inconsistent approach to performing the risk assessment is largely due to a lack of specificity in the requirement language as to the nature and parameters of the risk assessment. Accordingly, NERC will initiate a Reliability Standards development project to evaluate changes to CIP-014 to provide additional clarity on the risk assessment.

As discussed further below, the objective of the Reliability Standards development project would be to:
• Clarify the risk assessment methods for studying instability, uncontrolled separation, and Cascading; such as the expectations of dynamic studies to evaluate for instability.
• Clarify the case(s) used for the assessment to be tailored to the Requirement R1 in-service window and correct any discrepancies between the study period, frequency of study, and the base case a TO uses.
• Clarify the documentation, posting, and usage of known criteria to identify instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading as part of the risk assessment. The criteria should also include defining “inoperable” or “damaged” substations such that the intent of the risk assessment is clear.
• Clarify the risk assessment to account for adjacent substations of differing ownership, and substations within line-of-sight to each other.

Finally, while NERC is not recommending an expansion of the CIP-014 Applicability criteria at this time, NERC finds that, given the increase in physical security attacks on BPS substations, there is a need to evaluate additional reliability, resiliency, and security measures designed to mitigate the risks associated with those physical security attacks. As discussed further below, establishing a uniform, bright line set of minimum physical security protections for all (or even an additional subset of) BPS substations and associated primary controls centers, is unlikely to be an effective approach to mitigating physical security risks and their potential impacts on the reliable operation of the BPS. While a uniform set of minimum level of protections could potentially prevent some forms of physical security threats, NERC finds that such a pursuit lacks the application of a risk-based approach to expending industry resources, fails to provide for a methodical approach necessary to address site-specific threats or objectives (as expected using a design basis threat process), and does not consider the need for other reliability, resiliency, and security measures to mitigate the impact of a physical attack. These combined measures provide increased operational and planning capability as well as improved effectiveness of local network restoration. NERC finds that this more holistic approach will provide greater long-term flexibility and minimize the impacts of physical attacks on BPS reliability.


Full report can be found here >>

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