The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity’s first NIS360 report identifies areas for improvement and tracking of progress across NIS2 Directive sectors

The NIS360 is a new product by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity, ENISA, that assesses the maturity and criticality of NIS2 sectors, providing both a comparative and a more in-depth analysis.
The goal of the NIS360 is to help national authorities and cybersecurity agencies in the Member States tasked with the implementation of the NIS2, (1) to understand the overall picture, (2) to help them with prioritisation, (3) to highlight areas for improvement, and (4) to facilitate monitoring of sectors’ progress. The NIS360 also aims to support policy makers at national and EU level, to give input on policy and strategy development, and initiatives to build up cyber resilience.
The report sets out three main priorities. 
Firstly, it recommends that collaboration, within and between sectors is strengthened, through community-building events and cooperation at sector, national and EU level.
Secondly, within this NIS2 transposition period, it is becoming more of a priority to develop sector-specific guidance on how to implement the key NIS2 requirements in each sector. The report notes that national sectorial authorities are stepping up to implement the NIS2. While investments are increasing across sectors, further upskilling is required.
Thirdly, the NIS360 emphasises the need for both alignment of requirements across borders in each NIS sector, and for cross-border collaboration.
The EU Agency for Cybersecurity Executive Director, Juhan Lepassaar, highlighted: “ENISA is working closely with the EU Member States to implement the NIS2 Directive by providing expertise and guidance. The ENISA NIS360 gives valuable insight into the overall maturity of NIS sectors and the challenges of individual sectors. It explains where we stand, and how to move forward."
Key Findings at a Glance
Main findings include the following:
- Electricity, telecoms and banking are the three most critical and most mature sectors that stand out above the rest. These sectors have benefited from significant regulatory oversight, funding and investments, political focus, and overall a robust public-private partnership.
- Digital infrastructures, which includes critical services like internet exchanges, top-level domains, data centres, and cloud services, are a step below in terms of maturity. This NIS sector is very heterogeneous in terms of maturity of entities, and has a strong cross-border nature which complicates supervision, information sharing and collaboration.
- Six NIS sectors fall within the NIS360 risk zone, suggesting that there is room for improvement in their maturity relative to their criticality.
- ICT service management: The sector faces key challenges due to its cross-border nature and diverse entities. Strengthening its resilience requires close cooperation between authorities, reduced regulatory burdens for entities subject to both NIS2 and other legislation, and close cooperation in cross-border supervision.
- Space: Stakeholders’ limited cybersecurity knowledge and its heavy reliance on commercial off-the-shelf components present challenges for the sector. Enhancing its resilience requires better cybersecurity awareness, clear guidelines for pre-integration testing of components, and stronger collaboration with other sectors.
- Public administrations: Being very diverse, it is challenging for the sector to achieve a higher common level of maturity. The sector lacks the support and experience seen in more mature sectors. Being a prime target for hacktivism and state-nexus operations, the sector should aim to strengthen its cybersecurity capabilities leveraging the EU Cyber Solidarity Act and exploring shared service models among sector entities on common areas e.g., digital wallets.
- Maritime: The sector continues to face challenges with Operational Technology (OT) and could benefit from tailored cybersecurity risk management guidance that focuses on minimising sector-specific risks, as well as an EU-level cybersecurity exercise to enhance coordination and preparedness in both sectorial and multi-modal crisis management.
- Health: The health sector with an expanded coverage under NIS2, continues to face challenges such as the reliance on complex supply chains, legacy systems, and poorly secured medical devices. Strengthening its resilience requires the development of practical procurement guidelines to help organisations acquire secure services and products, tailored guidance to help overcome common issues, and staff awareness campaigns.
- Gas: The sector needs to continue working towards developing its incident readiness and response capabilities, through the development and testing of incident response plans at national and EU levels but also through enhanced collaboration with the electricity and manufacturing sectors.
The report is based on data from national authorities with a horizontal or sectorial mandate, on self-assessment by companies within the NIS2 sectors, and on EU data sources such as Eurostat. In the ENISA NIS360, the strengths, sectorial challenges, gaps are identified, and recommendations are made to improve sectorial maturity and resilience across the Union.

CISA and Partners Release Advisory on Ghost (Cring) Ransomware

CISA—in partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)—released a joint Cybersecurity Advisory, #StopRansomware: Ghost (Cring) Ransomware. This advisory provides network defenders with indicators of compromise (IOCs), tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and detection methods associated with Ghost ransomware activity identified through FBI investigations.
Ghost actors conduct these widespread attacks targeting and compromising organizations with outdated versions of software and firmware on their internet facing services. These malicious ransomware actors are known to use publicly available code to exploit Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) where available patches have not been applied to gain access to internet facing servers. The known CVEs are CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2010-2861, CVE-2009-3960, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207.
CISA encourages network defenders to review this advisory and apply the recommended mitigations. See #StopRansomware and the #StopRansomware Guide for additional guidance on ransomware protection, detection, and response.

CISA and FBI Warn of Malicious Cyber Actors Using Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities to Compromise Software

CISA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have released a Secure by Design Alert, Eliminating Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities, as part of their cooperative Secure by Design Alert series—an ongoing series aimed at advancing industry-wide best practices to eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities during the design and development phases of the product lifecycle. “Eliminating Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities” describes proven techniques to prevent or mitigate buffer overflow vulnerabilities through secure by design principles and best practices.
Buffer overflow vulnerabilities are a prevalent type of defect in memory-safe software design that can lead to system compromise. These vulnerabilities can lead to data corruption, sensitive data exposure, program crashes, and unauthorized code execution. Threat actors frequently exploit these vulnerabilities to gain initial access to an organization’s network and then move laterally to the wider network.
CISA and FBI urge manufacturers review the Alert and, where feasible, eliminate this class of defect by developing new software using memory-safe languages, using secure by design methods, and implementing the best practices supplied in this Alert. CISA and FBI also urge software customers demand secure products from manufacturers that include these preventions. Visit CISA’s Secure by Design Pledge page to learn about our voluntary pledge, which focuses on enterprise software products and services—including on-premises software, cloud services, and software as a service (SaaS).

Are we getting the deserved return-on-investment from the EU research on critical infrastructure resilience?

By October 17, 2024, the EU member states were supposed to notify the European Commission that the transposition of the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive into respective national laws had been accomplished. Only two (out of 27) member states managed to meet that deadline.
Could the EU research projects in the area of critical infrastructure/entities (CI/CE) resilience have helped more to mitigate this delay? Could that mitigation be part of a more optimal return on investment (RoI)? Was the investment in recent years (e.g., over 4.5 b€ in digital transformation initiatives, or 450 M€ for cybersecurity projects and civil security ) not adequate? Could it have produced more convincing answers to claims like “Europe’s critical infrastructure is becoming dangerously vulnerable” ? Especially in the context of new and evolving challenges or the “European CIs under continuous attacks” ?
There is a general agreement about the need to reach better RoI or, in the same context, Return on Research Investment (RoRI). But the agreement about how to do it practically is still to be achieved. Leaving the extreme positions aside, like “the only real RoI is the commercially measurable use of project results”, on one side, and “any use of project results represents RoI”, on the other side, one can opt for the middle ground and assume that “an evident use leading to tangible benefits represents an RoI”. For the CI/CE-related research, that can include, e.g., resilience standards, broadly adopted guidelines or evidence provided as inputs for the new EU and national policies. Applying such a definition, however, when searching for RoI-relevant results in the repositories of the EU project results such as CORDIS, Innovation Radar, or Dealflow, yields hardly any convincing evidence. The reported RoI-relevant results are often only vaguely described, not quantified, often out of date, and almost regularly lacking examples of real use or quantified benefits. As an example, the search for the results mentioning the CER Directive in the EU Dealflow tool provides no entries (January 2025). Similarly, the search for “resilience and infrastructure” among approx. 14,000 entries in the EU Innovation Radar, yields only 44 matches.
The reasons for the above can be numerous. E.g., the difficulty in aligning the needs and interests of industrial security and openness required by public research. Or, the lack of full-scale industry involvement (e.g., not participating with departments directly involved in production or marketing). Or, in the area of standardization, the rules and timing of standardization bodies being incompatible with the rules and timing of the EU projects. Or, the project results are simply not reported in the tools. Or, the main motivation of the researchers in the projects being to get new, follow-up projects, not necessarily to exploit the results of the finished ones. Many of these reasons are mentioned and explained in the recommendations of the evaluation reports made during the transition from one EU Framework Programme (FP) to another  , but less often implemented afterward. The fact that EU projects legally and practically do not exist after their final date, certainly also does not contribute to the sustainability of accessibility to project results and achieving good RoI.
In addition, imposing a too broad spectrum of (sometimes contradictory) goals, or the need to balance between breakthrough technology research and market success, on one side, and political constraints on the other side, can be very challenging for a good RoI. The latter is especially true and applicable to the area of CI/CE resilience, nowadays at the very top of the EU priorities . Their final results in many cases “never cross the chasm to the market, even if they achieved technological goals set in the project proposal”   (exceptions available, of course). Even worse, on the researchers’ side, the difficulties of meeting too many different or too highly set goals can lead to unrealistic or deceiving reporting, nowadays potentially worsened by the possible indiscriminate and unreported use of AI. On the EU side, limiting resources for monitoring the achievement of multiple goals, lower the threshold to clientelism.
How could the situation be improved? Generic, top-down, solutions suggested so far are generally well-aligned and present in the recommendations: strengthening and leveraging existing platforms (ERNCIP, Hubs, Radars…), better integration of research with industry and standardization, introducing mechanisms that support project continuity beyond formal completion, strong involvement of industry stakeholders, rewarding genuine success and penalizing exploitative practices, promoting monitoring and accountability, to mention just some of them. But, looking at the past decades of EU research, it seems that many suggested solutions have not been implemented as recommended.
Hence, the bottom-up solutions should be tried. Among them, establishing measurable indicators of success and robust evaluation systems is certainly at the top of the priority list. The data collection for the indicators such as those in the EUR 27314 EN should become mandatory and the indicators better known and understood, possibly including also the non-self-declared indicators of successful exploitation (which could be used for monitoring and stress-testing, too – e.g., in combination with standards like DIN 91461). The key research-to-market transfer RoI indicators, quantifying effectiveness, efficiency, and transformation are generally available, but not used because data are missing, and the mandates and obligations are not well defined, especially not at the EU level. The prerequisite for such a system is a joint EU strategy, e.g., similar to the recent US strategy documents  specifying both the overall framework and the need to “prioritize measurement”. A future extension of the CER Directive?
To conclude, the EU research on critical infrastructure resilience and researchers should be further encouraged and incentivized to deliver more tangible RoI, including results directly usable and useful for the application of the CER Directive and the overall EU resilience, thus helping in meeting both the deadlines like the “October 17, 2024” one and the top level goals like the ones declared by the EU7. The push should include also the readiness and courage to openly name and address the real issues, avoid the “newspeak”, and undertake efficiently the actions needed.
A. Jovanovi, Steinbeis European Risk & Resilience Institute, Germany

Indra leads the European SMAUG Project to improve underwater threat detection at ports and maritime borders

With the aim of improving and reinforcing the security of ports and their entry routes, Indra has launched the European SMAUG (Smart Maritime and Underwater Guardian) RDI project, as part of the European Union’s Horizon Europe program. The company heads the consortium of entities from seven European countries that will work together to improve the underwater detection of threats and illicit trafficking.
Over 80% of world trade is conducted by sea, and the continuous movement of vessels requires port security processes to be robust and effective, especially for monitoring and detecting legal and illegal activities at ports, in coastal areas and on borders. Geopolitical tensions are also turning the bottom of the oceans into sensitive terrain that needs to be protected.

Within this context, the SMAUG project seeks to detect, track and monitor potentially illegal and harmful movements and products entering EU ports and coasts by means of an integrated system based on Indra’s iSIM solution, which combines security management, advanced underwater detection systems and surveillance vessels.

More specifically, underwater threats are detected and located using four main methods. The first method is acoustic detection, in which a series of hydrophones listen for sounds emitted by small autonomous underwater vehicles. Secondly, a sonar performs a quick scan of the hull and the bottom of the harbor. The third method of underwater detection is high-resolution sonar inspection, which is used to inspect objects in water with poor visibility. Finally, collective autonomous location is employed, whereby a coordinated swarm of autonomous underwater vehicles act cooperatively.

These systems, supported by artificial intelligence, can more effectively detect unlawful and dangerous goods and/or threats hidden beneath the surface of the water. SMAUG will thus make a significant contribution to maritime security by improving the protection of infrastructures and vessels and the detection of vessels, including narco-submarines, suspected of conducting illegal or potentially dangerous activities.

As the leader of the SMAUG project, Indra brings its expertise in developing advanced algorithms for processing underwater sound and images, applying artificial intelligence for early detection of objects and threats. Additionally, it contributes its capabilities in the field of security for port infrastructure and maritime transport, providing solutions that enhance protection in complex maritime environments.

Its iSIM solution acts as a core for integration and analysis, unifying and processing data from physical security systems such as hydrophones, underwater scanners, drone swarms, and autonomous vehicles, along with satellite surveillance systems. It also takes information from port management systems, enabling a global and interoperable view that optimizes security, operational efficiency, and real-time decision-making.

International cooperation

Juan Román Martínez, the head of Indra’s SMAUG project, emphasized that ”this project means significant progress in maritime security, as it reinforces safety and promotes international cooperation in the fight against illicit activities in the maritime environment”.

With a budget of almost six million euros, the SMAUG RDI project involves a highly experienced consortium made up of 22 partners, including universities, research centers, SMEs, law enforcement agencies, public authorities, coast and border guards and private organizations from seven EU countries (Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway and Spain).

Among its capabilities, SMAUG is being prepared to achieve interoperability with the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE), in order to help create a political, cultural, legal and technical environment that allows exchanges of information between the surveillance systems of the member States of the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA). Thus, all of the authorities from the different sectors involved in port and maritime settings could have access to any additional classified and unclassified information required to perform missions at sea.

Indra will continue to drive a more secure, connected and sustainable future with this project, placing technology at the service of the safety and well-being of citizens in keeping with its motto:'Tech for Trust'. With innovation at the core of its business and unique experience going back over 30 years, the company boasts a comprehensive portfolio of pioneering solutions designed on an ad hoc basis to address all kinds of citizen security threats that have been implemented in countries all around the world.

The US Defense Industrial Base Risks & Opportunities

In this article, we examine how supply chain disruptions in minerals, electronics, and skilled labor are creating risks and opportunities in the US Defense Industrial Base (USDIB). 

Minerals: Rare Earth Elements

The USDIB relies on Rare Earth Elements (REEs).  REEs, loosely defined, are a set of 17 nearly indistinguishable lustrous silvery-white soft heavy metals. The term 'rare-earth' is misleading because they are not actually scarce. REEs are common throughout the Earth's crust.  However, because of their geochemical properties, most REEs are highly dispersed as trace elements. Geological regions with relatively high concentrations of REE are rare and even in these rare instances, obtaining usable quantities of pure REEs requires processing enormous amounts of raw material at great expense.

REE is mined by first removing rock from the ground that contains the REE.  Most rare-earth ores are mined by conventional open-pit methods in which rock is broken by blasting, loaded onto trucks with large shovels, and hauled to a concentration facility. Concentration is by physical separation of the REE-bearing minerals from all other minerals in the rock. The ore is crushed and ground in multiple stages until most of the rare-earth minerals interlocked with the other minerals are broken free. Next, in a method known as froth flotation, the rare-earth minerals are coated with a chemical that repels water and allows them to float to the surface attached to air bubbles in agitated tanks, where they are skimmed off as a concentrate. The remaining minerals are disposed of as waste and the REE concentrate is then ready for leaching.

The REE concentrate is then leached with an acid and the resulting REE-rich solution is then processed through sequential steps to recover individual REEs. For example, Cerium can be recovered by the addition of sodium hydroxide, which causes the cerium to drop out of solution as an oxide or hydroxide. The other REEs are typically separated by solvent extraction, a process in which an organic chemical specially designed to extract a particular REE is forced countercurrent to the REE-bearing leach solution.   Mining and concentration of REE ores presents conventional problems of concentrate waste disposal. For every ton of REEs produced, the process yields an estimated 75 cubic meters of wastewater and one ton of radioactive residue.

From the mid-1960s to the early 1990s, the United States was the world’s largest REE-producing country, with production coming entirely from the Mountain Pass mine in southeastern California. The mine was discovered in 1949 by a uranium prospector. The mine is located in San Bernardino County, California, on the south flank of the Clark Mountain Range. The mine has been active since 1952, with production expanding in the 1960s.  In 2020, the mine supplied 15.8% of the world's rare-earth production.   Today the mine is owned by MP Materials Corp (NYSE: MP). At this time, MP Materials Corp. is the largest producer of rare earth materials in the Western Hemisphere. The company recently raised $1B to expand its capacity.  The Mountain Pass mine is currently the only active REE mine in the United States.

In the late 1980s, China began mining their in-country REE deposits, processing their ore and extracting and separating the individual REEs for use in products, which they also manufactured. China quickly gained control of global REE production, providing 95 percent of the global market of processed REE by 2011.  Between 2011 and 2017, China produced approximately 84 percent of the world’s REEs.

China was able to establish dominance over the REE industry in large part because of its lower environmental regulations. Low cost, high pollution extraction methods enabled China to outpace competitors and create a strong foothold in the international REE market.  The largest REE mine in the world at this time is the Bayan-Obo mine in China. At this mine, there are an estimated 70,000 tons of radioactive thorium waste in storage ponds in the area. These waste ponds are not far from the Yellow River and there is concern that they could eventually leach into the river, which is a key source of drinking water for a substantial population.  To maintain its dominance in REEs, China is also in the process of expanding its REE mining operations outside of mainland China.  China has obtained rights to the REE deposits in a handful of African countries in return for infrastructure investment, including but not limited to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in return for building national roads, highways, and hospitals. China has obtained commercial licenses for REE mines in Kenya by agreeing to build a $600+ million data center.

President Trump’s recent comments that he wants the US to “purchase Greenland” have made international headlines. While we will not comment on the politics of this, we are glad to comment on one of the reasons why he said this. One reason was the Kvanefjeld deposit in Greenland is estimated by scientists to be one of the largest known REE deposits on earth. China has been in discussions with Greenland since 2017 about gaining rights to mine Kvanefjeld. To date, Greenland has rejected China’s offers regarding Kvanefjeld.  Given that much of the Island has not yet been fully explored for REEs, many scientists believe that Greenland may hold substantial REE deposits. Furthermore, with receding Artic Ice (due to global warming), the costs of extracting REEs from Greenland are expected to decline significantly.

Electronics: Computer Chips
Semiconductors and advanced electronics form the technological backbone of modern defense systems, powering communications, surveillance, and weapons guidance. However, the semiconductor industry has been plagued by significant supply disruptions. A global chip shortage that began with the COVID – 19 pandemic in 2020 has persisted, driven by surging demand, throughput constraints, and an overreliance on semiconductor fabs in Taiwan. Furthermore, China has made the leadership in the semiconductor industry a national strategic objective. According to the US based Semiconductor Industry Association, China has plans to invest more than $150 Billion in the sector between 2014 and 2030.

The U.S. government responded in 2022 with the Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors Act (CHIPS), which authorized $280 Billion to boost domestic research and manufacturing in the semiconductor industry in the US. In addition to this substantial amount of funding, the CHIPS Act also authorized Department of Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DoD), and Department of State (DOS) the authority to waive certain regulations to expedite the development of onshore domestic manufacturing of semiconductors critical to U.S. competitiveness and national security. The Act also includes safeguards to ensure that companies that receive Federal funds from the Act cannot use those funds to build advanced semiconductor production facilities in countries that present a national security threat to the US.  When announcing the Act, congress noted that only 12% of chips are currently manufactured domestically, compared to 37% in the 1990s.

Other specific provisions of the Act included:
• $39 billion in immediate financial assistance to build, expand, or modernize domestic facilities and equipment for semiconductor fabrication
• $11 billion for DOC research and development.
• $2 billion for the DoD to implement the Microelectronics Commons, a national network for onshore, university-based prototyping, lab-to-fab transition of semiconductor technologies
• Waivers of certain environmental and other regulatory requirements necessary to construct and operate new semiconductor fabrication facilities

Skilled Labor 
While supplies of REEs and advanced semiconductors are crucial to the USDIB, a skilled workforce in manufacturing remains the most essential component of the defense supply chain. The USDIB is experiencing a severe shortage of qualified manufacturing professionals, from engineers to machinists. Several factors contribute to this challenge, including an aging workforce and insufficient training pipelines for specialized defense roles. This talent gap not only hampers production schedules but also slows innovation.

Today, the manufacturing sector is not a top choice for the newest generation of workers. Just 14% of Gen Zers say they would consider a career in manufacturing, because of expectations of: low pay and dangerous work conditions. Their disinterest has resulted in a rapidly aging workforce. About 51% of manufacturing jobs are held by employees ages 45-65 or older (Clear Company, manufacturing-workforce-trends-development-strategies, 2025).

There are some near-term solutions to this problem. Employers can establish apprenticeship programs in collaboration with local technical schools to build a pipeline of future talent. These programs are increasingly recognized as critical for addressing the workforce shortages in defense manufacturing. The Department of Defense's Manufacturing Education and Workforce Development (M-EWD) Program, for instance, collaborates with industry stakeholders to create skilled professionals who are equipped to meet the demands of advanced manufacturing. This initiative focuses on bridging the gap between educational systems and real-world manufacturing needs.  Also, ensuring that workers are prepared for the technology-driven advancements in defense sectors such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and advanced materials. This proactive approach not only helps close the skills gap but also strengthens the pipeline of human capital for middle market defense companies by providing students with valuable, career-oriented training in high-demand fields. Employers can partner with higher education institutions to create specialized training initiatives tailored to defense sector needs. Such partnerships are essential for ensuring that the talent entering the defense industry has the precise skills required for the evolving technological landscape. The Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) plays a leading role in advocating for the development of specialized training, reskilling, and educational programs that align with the needs of the defense industry. By working with colleges and universities, defense companies can ensure that curricula are closely aligned with current and future technological demands, such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and aerospace engineering. These initiatives also help cultivate a more adaptable workforce, equipped to handle the rapid pace of innovation in the sector.

Weapons Manufacturing Capacity
In 2024, the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) reported that China’s defense industrial base is operating on a wartime footing, while the U.S. defense industrial base is largely operating on a peacetime footing. The report went on to state that “the U.S. defense industrial ecosystem lacks the capacity, responsiveness, flexibility, and surge capability to meet the U.S. military’s production and warfighting needs.” Unless there are urgent changes, the United States risks weakening deterrence and undermining its warfighting capabilities. China is heavily investing in munitions and acquiring high-end weapons systems and equipment five to six times faster than the United States. China is also the world’s largest shipbuilder and has a shipbuilding capacity that is roughly 200 times larger than the United States. According to the CSIS 2024 report, China’s largest shipyard, Jiangnan, has more capacity than all U.S. shipyards combined.

While the pandemic was not the only cause of this problem, it was certainly a catalyst. Lockdowns and business closures set off supply chain disruptions that led to a 43% decline in all US manufacturing output and a 38% drop in hours worked, the largest since World War II, and manufacturers were forced to lay off their employees. Some of the 1.4 million workers across all sectors, who lost their jobs left permanently, whether they retired early, began working in a different industry, or left the workforce for other reasons.

In the years since, US manufacturing has had an impressive recovery. The industry has added nearly 800,000 jobs since 2021. According to the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) Manufacturers’ Outlook Survey, companies’ optimism about their future is rising. Even with growth, manufacturing still anticipates a long struggle with the talent shortage. Despite the addition of so many jobs, almost 550,000 are currently vacant, and research from Deloitte and The Manufacturing Institute indicates that this number will increase. An estimated four million manufacturing employees will be needed by 2030 in the US.

What This Means for Middle-Market Defense Contractors
From our vantage point as M&A bankers in the middle market of the aerospace & defense industry, we have a unique view.  We can see what is happening in real-time in the supply chain.  We hear from the owners of these companies - what keeps them up at night.  And we hear from the buyers of these companies - what opportunities they see and why they are making substantial investments.

The Risks
There are three risks facing the middle market of the USDIB that we keep hearing:
• First, China is the biggest single threat to the US, not just terms of the risk of kinetic attack, but moreover in terms of non-kinetic warfare, including but not limited to the disruption of critical supply chains.
• Second, behind ‘China Risk’, is the risk of an aging USDIB manufacturing workforce
• Third, is the lack of investment into USDIB manufacturing infrastructure for decades

The Opportunity
While the risks facing the USDIB are substantial, the opportunity facing the middle market of the USDIB is even greater.  Today, we are hearing repeatedly and loudly, especially from active buyers in the sector, the following:
• Manufacturing throughout the USDIB will experience a significant resurgence over the next 3-5 years, in terms of demand from the Department of Defense, the influx of new workers, and the flow of investment capital.

By Bruce Andrews, Partner and Troy Medeiros, Vice President, Alderman And Company

The latest issue of Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience News has arrived

Download your copy now at www.cip-association.org/CIPRNews
Please find here your downloadable copy of the Winter 2024-25 issue of Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience News, the official magazine of the International Association of CIP Professionals (IACIPP), for the latest views, features and news, including a Preview of the upcoming Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience North America conference, taking place in Houston, TX on March 11th-13th, and co-hosted by InfraGard Houston.
Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience News in this issue:
- Are we getting the deserved return-on-investment from the EU research on critical infrastructure resilience?
- Reducing disaster risks to deliver a resilient future
- New report: Terrorists exploiting global tensions
- The future of risk communications is community engagement
- Navigating cybersecurity investments in the time of NIS 2
- Improving Red Teaming for Critical Infrastructure Protection: A Comprehensive Approach
- Artificial Intelligence Perspective: The Changing of the Guard
- Shaping the Future of AI in Security: CoESS Launches Ethical and Responsible AI Charter
- Preview of Critical Infrastructure Protection & Resilience North America
- Infragard Building Cross-sector Collaboration for Enhancing Resilience
- Counter-Drone Technology for Critical Infrastructure: Your Layered Security Stack is the Sum of Its Parts
- Harnessing AI to Secure America’s Rural Critical Infrastructure
- Ensuring Compliance with the EU CER Directive: Protecting Critical Fiber Optic Infrastructure
- An Interview with 3B Protection
- The evolution of underwater threats
- An Interview with SimSpace
- Agency News
- Industry News
Download your copy at www.cip-association.org/CIPRNews
#criticalinfrastructureprotection #criticalinfrastructure #resilience #cybersecurity #emergencymanagement #riskmitigation #portsecurity #homelandsecurity #firstresponder #riskmanagement #ai #artificalintelligence #energysecurity #gridresilience

CISA Partners with ASD’s ACSC, CCCS, NCSC-UK, and Other International and US Organizations to Release Guidance on Edge Devices

CISA—in partnership with international and U.S. organizations—released guidance to help organizations protect their network edge devices and appliances, such as firewalls, routers, virtual private networks (VPN) gateways, Internet of Things (IoT) devices, internet-facing servers, and internet-facing operational technology (OT) systems.
The published guidance is as follows:
- “Security Considerations for Edge Devices,” led by the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), a part of the Communications Security Establishment Canada.
- “Digital Forensics Monitoring Specifications for Products of Network Devices and Applications,” led by the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK).
- “Mitigation Strategies for Edge Devices: Executive Guidance” and “Mitigation Strategies for Edge Devices: Practitioner Guidance,” two separate guides led by the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC).
Foreign adversaries routinely exploit software vulnerabilities in network edge devices to infiltrate critical infrastructure networks and systems. The damage can be expensive, time-consuming, and reputationally catastrophic for public and private sector organizations. These guidance documents detail various considerations and strategies for a more secure and resilient network both before and after a compromise.
CISA and partner agencies urge device manufacturers and critical infrastructure owners and operators to review and implement the recommended actions and mitigations in the publications. Device manufacturers, please visit CISA’s Secure by Design page for more information on how to align development processes with the goal of reducing the prevalence of vulnerabilities in devices. Critical infrastructure owners and operators, please see Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products for guidance on procuring secure products.

CISA and US and International Partners Publish Guidance on Priority Considerations in Product Selection for OT Owners and Operators

CISA—along with U.S. and international partners—released joint guidance Secure by Demand: Priority Considerations for Operational Technology Owners and Operators when Selecting Digital Products. As part of CISA’s Secure by Demand series, this guidance focuses on helping customers identify manufacturers dedicated to continuous improvement and achieving a better cost balance, as well as how Operational Technology (OT) owners and operators should integrate secure by design elements into their procurement process.
Critical infrastructure and industrial control systems are prime targets for cyberattacks. The authoring agencies warn that threat actors, when compromising OT components, target specific OT products rather than specific organizations. Many OT products are not designed and developed with Secure by Design principles and often have easily exploited weaknesses. When procuring products, OT owners and operators should select products from manufacturers who prioritize security elements identified in this guidance.
For more information on questions to consider during procurement discussions, see CISA’s Secure by Demand Guide: How Software Customers Can Drive a Secure Technology Ecosystem. To learn more about secure by design principles and practices, visit Secure by Design.

Artificial Intelligence: DHS Needs to Improve Risk Assessment Guidance for Critical Infrastructure Sectors

Federal agencies with a lead role in protecting the nation's critical infrastructure sectors are referred to as sector risk management agencies. These agencies, in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), were required to develop and submit initial risk assessments for each of the critical infrastructure sectors to DHS by January 2024.
Although the agencies submitted the sector risk assessments to DHS as required, none fully addressed the six activities that establish a foundation for effective risk assessment and mitigation of potential artificial intelligence (AI) risks. For example, while all assessments identified AI use cases, such as monitoring and enhancing digital and physical surveillance, most did not fully identify potential risks, including the likelihood of a risk occurring. None of the assessments fully evaluated the level of risk in that they did not include a measurement that reflected both the magnitude of harm (level of impact) and the probability of an event occurring (likelihood of occurrence). Further, no agencies fully mapped mitigation strategies to risks because the level of risk was not evaluated.
Lead agencies provided several reasons for their mixed progress, including being provided only 90 days to complete their initial assessments. A key contributing factor was that DHS's initial guidance to agencies on preparing the risk assessments did not fully address all the above activities.
Artificial intelligence is complex and evolving. It could be used to improve the systems that operate critical infrastructure, like water and energy. But it could also make them more vulnerable to cyberattacks.
Federal agencies that protect critical infrastructure had to assess AI risks to infrastructure sectors. But the Department of Homeland Security's guidance for assessments didn't have agencies fully measure how much harm an attack could cause or the probability of attacks. This information would help agencies address risks and foster responsible AI use.
DHS and CISA have made various improvements, including issuing new guidance and a revised risk assessment template in August 2024. The template addresses some—but not all—of the gaps that GAO found. Specifically, the new template does not fully address the activities for identifying potential risks including the likelihood of a risk occurring. CISA officials stated that the agency plans to further update its guidance in November 2024 to address the remaining gaps. Doing so expeditiously would enable lead agencies to use the updated guidance for their required January 2025 AI risk assessments.
AI has the potential to introduce improvements and rapidly change many areas. However, deploying AI may make critical infrastructure systems that support the nation's essential functions, such as supplying water, generating electricity, and producing food, more vulnerable. In October 2023, the President issued Executive Order 14110 for the responsible development and use of AI. The order requires lead federal agencies to evaluate and, beginning in 2024, annually report to DHS on AI risks to critical infrastructure sectors.
GAO's report examines the extent to which lead agencies have evaluated potential risks related to the use of AI in critical infrastructure sectors and developed mitigation strategies to address the identified risks. To do so, GAO analyzed federal policies and guidance to identify activities and key factors for developing AI risk assessments. GAO analyzed lead agencies' 16 sector and one subsector risk assessments against these activities and key factors. GAO also interviewed officials to obtain information about the risk assessment process and plans for future templates and guidance.
Recommendations
GAO is recommending that DHS act quickly to update its guidance and template for AI risk assessments to address the remaining gaps identified in this report. DHS agreed with our recommendation and stated it plans to provide agencies with additional guidance that addresses gaps in the report including identifying potential risks and evaluating the level of risk.
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