CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

CONCEPT AND SECURITY CHALLENGES

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Content

Preface

Around the end of this year, which marks the 70th anniversary of NATO's foundation, the Alliance member states are expected to complete their national ratifications of the NATO Accession Protocol with the Republic of North Macedonia, making it officially the latest and 30th member state of the Alliance.

Aside from producing a variety of security, as well as economic and social benefits for each member state, being part of NATO also implies a lot of hard work, commitments and obligations for each segment of Macedonian society – the citizens individually, the institutions, organizations, and everyone else. This particularly comes to the fore when it comes to the issue of improving the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, as well as boosting the development of the education and healthcare system in the country

It is precisely for these reasons that the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung decided to provide its input to this process by lending its support to certain endeavours that could prove useful to both the country as a whole and the individual sets of policies it will be pursuing over the next stages of its integration into NATO. The topic of critical infrastructure protection was brought forward in this context by the group of academic authors who co-wrote this publication and, after an inclusive process involving public debates and experts presenting their views on this matter, the final version of the material on critical infrastructure protection eventually saw the light of day.

Using Croatia as an individual example, it was vital to do case studies on newer member states of the Alliance, thus drawing on the experiences and learning of their own process of integration into NATO and how they have been functioning as full-fledged member states of the Alliance. Sharing experiences and good practices in this manner will be vital at this point when the country is going through the final stage of acceding to NATO, as well as in the months and years to come after the official accession when policies will start taking shape and be put into operation.

Having been put together to provide a presentation and elaborate upon all aspects of critical infrastructure protection, as well as to encourage activities to create a national strategy and ultimately adopt a law on critical infrastructure protection in the Republic of North Macedonia, we sincerely hope that this publication will draw the interest of the expert community in the country with regard to this matter and will prove to be of particular use to the relevant institutions when dealing with it going forward.

Nita Starova
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Skopje Office

Introduction

The idea of writing a book like the one in front of you, entitled ***"Critical Infrastructure: Concept and Security Challenges"*** is a bold scholarly and erudite step. We have directed our long-term scientific and research career to several premises. The first basic premise of this book begins with the concept of critical infrastructure as a general set of values and goods that are essential to the economy, the state and the society. Disruption or destruction of such values and goods could have long-term detrimental effects on the core values of the society. Consequently, when creating a modern concept of critical infrastructure protection one recognizes the need to build a coordinated approach.

The second premise that characterizes this book is aimed at showing that the security problems faced by the states today have reached a level of seriousness and urgency. In such situations, it is understandable that quick fixes and ad hoc solutions are not enough and therefore it is necessary to consider actions that will help, or require an effective way of changing the approach to critical infrastructure protection.

The third basic premise of this book is the domain of critical infrastructure protection at national level, that is, individually and for this purpose we have singled out the examples of the United States and Croatia and the polices and processes that the EU and NATO have initiated and are striving to coordinate. These experiences are deemed valuable for future directions in the creation of the critical infrastructure protection system in the Republic of North Macedonia.

In the interest of a comprehensive analysis, we have also included two eminent foreign critical infrastructure experts, namely, Richard Larkin and Matthew Vatter. Their participation in this project, through their analysis of critical infrastructure protection in the United States, adds particular importance to the book in seeking a meaningful solution in the creation of a critical infrastructure protection system in the Republic of North Macedonia.

The content of ***"Critical Infrastructure: Concept and Security Challenges"*** is systematized in six chapters.

Within the **first chapter** entitled ***"Critical Infrastructure: Notion and Concept"***, the emphasis is put on the notional determination of infrastructure as critical. In this context are also elaborated the threats on critical infrastructure and the need for critical infrastructure protection. Furthermore, this part also includes a section referring to the analysis of the Critical Infrastructure Indicative List.

In the **second chapter** entitled ***"Critical Infrastructure Protection in the European Union"***, the focus of the research is dedicated to the development of critical infrastructure protection from the perspective of the European Union, the work of the Union's institutions and the orientation of this domain for cooperation with the private sector. This part also covers the section concerning Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and determination of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection.

In the **third chapter** entitled ***"Critical Infrastructure Protection in NATO"***, the focus of interest is the Alliance's place and role in critical infrastructure protection and through critical analysis of a segment of NATO's involvement and role in critical infrastructure protection an attempt is made to tackle several important issues. One of them is whether NATO is conducting excessive securitization and militarization of the energy sector, which is dominantly perceived as an exceptional economic issue and whether there is an appropriate role and opportunity for engaging NATO in critical infrastructure protection within the framework of strategic concepts, especially after the end of the Cold War.

Within the **fourth chapter** entitled ***"Critical Infrastructure Protection in the United States"***, the emphasis is put on analyzing one of the leading countries in the development of critical infrastructure protection. In this context, the concept and system of critical infrastructure protection with the three basic segments the functional, political and technical mechanisms for critical infrastructure protection are very carefully elaborated.

In the **fifth chapter** entitled ***"Critical Infrastructure Protection in Croatia",*** the achievements in the development of critical infrastructure in Croatia made so far have been analyzed. In this context, Croatia's approach has been elaborated upon adoption of the Law on Critical Infrastructure Protection and bylaws, as well as the organization of the critical infrastructure protection system.

The **sixth chapter** entitled ***"Republic of North Macedonia and Critical Infrastructure Protection",*** provides an overview of the current situation in the Republic of North Macedonia related to building an efficient system for critical infrastructure protection. This section identifies priority sectors of critical infrastructure such as energy, information technologies, water systems and air transport. In each of the sectors mentioned, as a result of the reform efforts of the state, there are certain laws and bylaws that can enable effective regulation of critical infrastructure protection. Based on such situations, appropriate measures and recommendations are being offered that would be most useful in the organization of critical infrastructure protection. As an example, the ways and opportunities for creating an effective strategy for protection of critical energy infrastructure are offered. The strategy, after identifying the existing risks, should provide the right direction to overcome the situation of lack of positive legislation on critical energy infrastructure. However, the authors emphasize that partial solutions have been identified in different sectors of critical infrastructure, which are not faulty but are likely to contribute to "stifling" the entire process of designing and efficient functioning of the optimal system for critical infrastructure protection. As a result of such situations, at the end of the chapter, broader recommendations have been given that should outline practical steps towards building an effective system for critical infrastructure protection.

We express our gratitude to the reviewers Professor Jonas Johansson, Director for Critical Infrastructure Protection Research, Lund University, Sweden and Professor Roberto Setola, Univertsita Capmus Bio-Medico di Roma, Italy, for presenting us with the honour of accepting to peer review this manuscript, and their knowledgeable, academic and sincere support for the publication of this book.

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The authors
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CHAPTER 3

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN NATO

CHAPTER 3

Critical Infrastructure Protection in NATO

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The approach and contribution of NATO in the critical infrastructure protection is still a topic of numerous political debates and scientific analyses. Although the complex role of NATO after the break-up of the bipolar world is a major feature in the years to come, we can conclude that with its evolution, the discourses of its interest are evolving as well. It is evident that the attempts for politicization and securitization of energy supply, the involvement and role of NATO in the field of energy security and critical infrastructure protection open a wide array of NATO's role.

What should be mentioned straightaway, and at the same time profiles the structure and character of the Alliance in the post-Cold War period is the Communiqué of the Riga Summit where special emphasis is placed on the protection of energy infrastructure as part of energy security. In this respect, it is important to note that NATO owns and operates significant strategic assets, including 10 different 12.000 kilometer pipelines for transportation of aviation fuel, passing through 12 NATO countries and connecting storage depots, air bases, civil airports, gas stations, refineries and ports, including the largest NATO pipeline system, i.e. the Central European Pipeline System (CEPS). For four decades, NATO has been managing CEPS and pursuing its commercial and business interests, it is being rented for industrial purposes providing aviation fuel for major commercial airports in Europe. The entire aircraft fuel for the needs of the airlines at the Brussels airport, as well as most of the fuel for the airports in Frankfurt (Germany) and Schiphol (Netherlands) is acquired through CEPS. World War II memories were still very fresh when the construction of CEPS began and it was designed to withstand the toughest war conditions. It has numerous pumping stations, strengthened critical areas, entrenched pipelines and emergency response and repair teams are available at any time. In conditions of intensified dialogue between the Euro-Atlantic partners for energy security and its transport systems, NATO has a lot to offer. (Bell, 2009: 268).

In this Chapter, following these undisputed facts, we will try to tackle several important issues through a critical analysis of one segment of the involvement and the role of NATO in protecting critical infrastructure. One of them is whether NATO is doing excessive securitization and militarization of the energy sector, which is dominantly regarded as an exceptional economic issue, and whether there is an adequate role and opportunity for NATO's involvement in protecting critical infrastructure within strategic concepts, especially after the end of the Cold War.

3.1. Strategic Framework of Critical Infrastructure Protection Concept

In general, we can agree that NATO has been regulating and strictly protecting its critical infrastructures since its establishment. According to the Alliance's founding document, there are several possible scenarios in which NATO should play a role in critical infrastructure protection. First, to provide support to military operations of the Alliance under the provision of Article 5. Second, to provide support of crisis response operations beyond the provision of Article 5. Third, to provide support to national authorities in emergencies of non-military character. Fourth, to provide support to national authorities in protecting their population from the consequences of weapons of mass destruction. Fifth, to establish co-partnership with partners in the area of civil emergency planning. (Babos, 2016).

According to the protocol created during the Cold War, NATO provides security for critical infrastructure of the Alliance and its Member States. In order to provide a coordinated approach to civilian emergency planning, the key role is assigned to the Civil Emergency Planning Committee, which directly reports to the North Atlantic Council.

Civil emergency planning is an important activity in the prediction process and it is directed at coordinating national resources. In the context of natural and man-made disasters, the contracts strengthen NATO's role in emergencies. Examples may include the "NATO Policy on Disaster Assistance in Peace Time" of May 9, 1995 or the statement "Enhanced Practical Cooperation in the field of Disaster Relief" of May 29, 1998. In addition, NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept recognizes major catastrophes as a source of concern for security and stability.

The term "critical infrastructure protection" – according to Clinton's Directive from 1998, after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, was immediately placed on the agenda of the North Atlantic Council. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the NATO Summit in Prague initiated the "Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan". In particular, Article 4, item d of the Declaration from the Summit states: "…we are committed, in cooperation with our partners, to fully implement the Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan for the improvement of civil preparedness against possible attacks against the civilian population with chemical, biological or radiological agents. We will enhance our ability to provide support, when requested, to help national authorities to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks, including attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons against critical infrastructure, as foreseen in the Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan". (Prague Summit Declaration, 2002). In addition, testing exercises and subsequent improvement of interoperability were planned. At the same time, the "Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism" was published.

After September 11, the readiness of NATO Member States in the area of critical infrastructure protection was considered. The result of such activity is the concept document for critical infrastructure protection, prepared by the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee. The main goals are summarized in the exchange of information among stakeholders, assistance and development of training and education programs that contribute to identifying critical infrastructure, determining research to support critical infrastructure protection and assistance

during exercise activities. Planning Boards and Committees of the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee have commenced the necessary studies. National experts from governments and industry, as well as military representatives, coordinate the planning of eight technical domains: civil aviation, civil protection, food safety, industrial production and logistics, internal land transport, issues in the field of medicine, shipment and in the end civilian electronic communications. In 2005, the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee adopted and adjusted the Action Plan in order to cover efforts during and after terrorist attacks with chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons. The plan focused on critical infrastructure protection and victims support.

Consequently, the increased activity of European Allies in the field of critical infrastructure protection is the result of the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004, the cyber-attacks in Estonia in 2007, the Russia-Georgia conflict in 2008, the pirate attacks that have been continuously occurring since 2008 in the Gulf of Aden and the shores of Somalia as well as the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine relations. In addition to the conceptual and strategic document for critical infrastructure protection, NATO, today, also creates and implements policy and practices at operational level. (Babos, 2016: 12).

At strategic level, the beginnings of NATO's interest and activities in the area of critical infrastructure protection date back to 1990 and the NATO Summit held in London. As a result of the guidelines given at the London Summit, a new Strategic Concept of NATO was created in 1991. In this strategic document, the Alliance begins to promote critical infrastructure security related to vital energy resources. Namely, according to the NATO Strategic Concept of 1991, the disruption of the flow of vital resources is defined as a potential security threat to the interests of the Alliance (paragraph 12) (The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, 1991). At the Washington Summit in 1999, the very same conclusion was noted by the Alliance in the then approved new Strategic Concept (paragraph 24) (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999).

According to the content of NATO's Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, critical infrastructure is first and foremost clearly and unambiguously mentioned in the section on "cyber" attacks. Paragraph 12 underlines that "cyber" attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure. In addition, it is emphasized that "cyber" attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability. Foreign militaries and intelligence services, organised criminals, terrorist and/or extremist groups can each be the source of such attacks.

Paragraph 19 of the Strategic Concept emphasizes the commitment to develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners and consultations among Allies on the basis of strategic assessments and contingency planning (Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010: 11-17).

Strategic commitments to NATO's critical infrastructure grounded in its strategic concepts reflect the intense debates on energy security as an issue that is intensely debated internationally. NATO's activity in this field practically dates back even before it was included in the strategic concepts. Namely, during the Cold War, the Alliance maintained and provided a gas pipeline system for the supply of natural gas to own forces and the critical infrastructure in Europe.

It is this discourse that will serve us to explain in more detail the complex content about the place, the role and the involvement of NATO in critical infrastructure protection.

3.2. Involvement and Role of the Alliance in Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection

As previously mentioned, problems related to energy security, including critical infrastructure protection, have not been a basic thematic content exclusively to economic forums for quite some time. This means that these topics are increasingly becoming the main content within the framework of international political meetings at the highest level. Trade exchange of basic energy resources is not only an economic issue, but it is rather becoming a political issue as well. Moreover, given that NATO as a military-political Alliance more and more put regularity and stability in the energy supply on its work agendas, clearly it can be concluded that the supply of energy and everything related to that supply is a topic of the security discourse, but an interest of NATO as well.

However, NATO's involvement in critical infrastructure protection has its own critical component. We will try to analyze it through the corpus of issues related to energy security and critical energy infrastructure.

The possibility of involvement and the role of NATO in the field of energy security has two crucial moments. The first moment has a more military and security focus that reflects the dual need of the Alliance to implement practical and logistic planning for protection of energy supplies, especially oil, while maintaining wider security of its Member States and stability of own operational capability.

This conclusion implies consideration of the military threats to energy facilities as well as the routes for supplying energy resources. The possibilities for escalation of efforts to establish control over producers, transit countries in terms of energy (pipelines, gas pipelines) and their own security are the relevant factors of possible military confrontations. Some analysts argue that the possibility of accessing energy resources can become the subject of major military confrontations and poses a serious problem in the functioning of the modern international system. Pirate and terrorist attacks increase this risk.

According to a report by the United Nations, in the period from 2010 to 2014 the energy sector was extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Most of the terrorist attacks in the given period occurred in Pakistan (439), then in Yemen (170), Colombia (161), Iraq (146), the Philippines (73), India (42), Nigeria (38), Thailand (37), Turkey (28) and the like (CTED Trends Reports, 2017: 4-5). Such wide geographical dispersion of terrorism and critical energy infrastructure phenomena enables

maritime energy security to have vital significance. This requires effective tackling of illegal activities and disruptions of energy supply to a relatively large operating space. It is known that more than two thirds of the world is covered with salt water and approximately 80% of world trade is waterway trade. What we can notice as an energy security problem is the fact that most of the world's oceans are not under state jurisdiction (Wilson, 2012).

The second moment for NATO's involvement in energy security discussions is more focused on political pressure and threats to energy security. This attitude can be identified and emphasized especially after the dispute between Ukraine and Russia's "Gazprom". A political pressure, which manifested itself with a stoppage of gas supplies, in early 2006. Russian authorities explained this act as solely due to economic reasons. The increase of oil and gas prices for the countries of the former Soviet Union marked the end of the era when they bought energy at a lower price. In this way, official Moscow seeks to keep the debate on the economic field, emphasizing that the price increase has economic and not political significance. Russia's finance and economy ministers stressed that the adjustment of Russian energy prices to world prices by 2011 is one of the conditions for Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization. Russia became a WTO member in 2012. (Radoman, 2007). Such events stimulated the discussion of energy security and critical infrastructure protection within NATO.

Both moments undoubtedly resulted in a conceptual difference in terms of achieving the main goal. Namely, the dilemma is set to the following level: should the Alliance adopt a broader "thematic" approach to energy security and critical energy infrastructure protection, in which the interests of the "producer", "transit" and "consumer" state are effectively seen in similar light – against threats that undermine everyone's interest, such as an attack on the main supply route? Or it needs to adopt a more regional and direct approach, in which the interests of the "producer" and the "consumer" differ – which basically carries the influence of a powerful Alliance in the support of the "consumer" country in what is considered a competitive "producer" – "consumer" dialogue.

NATO's practical action related to energy security dates back to July 30, 2007, when a fleet of six Alliance Members (Denmark, the United States, Germany, Portugal, Canada, and the Netherlands) headed for a long trip to Africa. The statement of former NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, that the high priority of NATO Member States is maritime security and the provision of safe passages for the transport of fuels, determines the starting point for the Alliance's action in the context of energy security and route protection and critical energy infrastructure.

The main goal of NATO's mission was directed towards the Niger delta, where criminal gangs attacked oil installations and kidnapped workers who worked on oil platforms. For the first time in the history of NATO, joint maritime exercises were carried out along with the South African Navy, which in September 2007 also moved into dangerous waters off the coast of Somalia, where pirate attacks increased. The intention of this two-month mission was to demonstrate NATO's capabilities for the use of military assets and to guarantee the Law on the High

Seas, which, inter alia, includes the protection of the right for passage of the vital energy resources (Mileski, 2014: 47-48).

In the context of the need for the Alliance's involvement in energy security and critical energy infrastructure protection, the Riga Summit, held in November 2006, is particularly important. In autumn 2006, NATO made the final preparations for the missions, and at the Riga Summit the Allies were still quite divided on whether energy security was part of the Alliance's mission. In this role of NATO, several Member States recognized the interests of the European Union. However, after a year of persuasions, the then Secretary General succeeded in putting energy security on NATO's agenda. First, Scheffer managed to impose this issue at an informal meeting between NATO officials and foreign ministers of the Member States of the European Union. Then, in February 2006, at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, he reiterated the commitment to expand and deepen formal political and security discussions within NATO to cover more key issues, while undoubtedly referring to energy security. In order to continue further discussions, NATO leaders scheduled a NATO Forum on Energy Security in Prague, announcing the presence of a number of prime ministers, energy ministers, senior NATO officials, as well as senior representatives from the global energy community. (Bell, 2009: 261-262). After numerous remarks by several governments of the Allies, especially France, the Secretary-General was confronted with new problems including the ban for the members of NATO's International Headquarters to give presentations at that Conference. The then NATO statement stressed that NATO had no formal role in the field of energy security and safety of oil and gas pipelines, and that NATO did not consider any military involvement in protecting oil and gas infrastructure in the Caucasus or any other region. However, until the NATO Summit in Riga, the US efforts as well as Europe's concern for Russia's use of gas and oil as an instrument for political influence, made it clear that NATO could no longer ignore energy security. In a document adopted at the Summit entitled "Comprehensive Political Leadership", NATO leaders point out that the violation of normal movement of vital resources will constitute one of the main threats to the Alliance over the next 10 to 15 years. Recognizing the efforts of the NATO Secretary General, a consensus was reached, and implemented in the NATO Summit Declaration in Riga.

The Riga Declaration represents a significant starting point for any analysis of NATO's role in energy security and critical energy infrastructure protection. Namely, Article 45 of the Declaration stipulates that NATO's security interests can be affected by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The Alliance supports a coordinated, international effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure security. The individual engagement of NATO Member States has been identified even before the discussion on the role of the Alliance in the field of energy security. We can detect it in the period of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war. Then, Britain, France and the Netherlands participated in "Earnest Will" Operation, providing the routes for tankers in the Persian Gulf (Varwick, 2008: 39).

After the Riga Summit, serious political disagreements between the Allies regarding NATO's role in the field of energy security remained evident. At the meetings of various political-military bodies, there have been more questions than answers. In February 2007, a Working Group on Energy Security was formed within

NATO for the first time. Its task was to point out all the issues that the Alliance had to answer before building any framework or policy on energy security, namely:

- define the role of NATO forces in the protection of energy infrastructure;
- identify problems in all NATO missions in providing safe transit corridors for oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz and other specific locations, as well as providing a not provocatively presence at sensitive locations for oil and gas production;
- integrate polices for security of supply among all Alliance members (Mileski, 2014: 50).

Namely, the Riga Summit Declaration included a short paragraph explicitly announcing (for the first time) that energy security is a concern of NATO, giving the Alliance a task to explore the specifics of that role. In the Declaration, the nature of the discussion changed, so it is no longer about whether the Alliance has a role, that is, it confirms that it has one. The question is now about the nature of that role. Another important moment is the speech of the US Senator Richard Lugar on the side-lines of the Riga Summit. The speech points to the threats from terrorism, as well as to the fact that energy is likely to be a source of armed conflicts on the European scene as well as in the surrounding regions. In that way, Lugar emphasizes that it would be irresponsible for NATO to reduce its engagement in the field of energy security. However, his focus was directed to the potential of political manipulation of resources and the use of "energy weapons". Lugar's speech was the subject of attention of the entire international public.

After the adoption of the Riga Declaration, the political moment continued to gain greater significance, especially after the dispute over the discontinuation of gas supplies between Russia and Belarus in December 2006 and January 2007. The same thing happened in the years to come. On January 31, 2008, Russia halted gas supplies to Ukraine, due to unpaid bills and the price of gas. The Russia-Ukraine dispute over the gas price left ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe without that fuel. Countries like Moldova, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, and North Macedonia remained without heating gas and electricity production**,** while Turkey, Greece, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Austria faced gas shortage. The political moment apparently had its peak in January 2009. The disruption of Russian gas supplies to Ukraine has caused major discomfort in the European Union because 40% of natural gas for the European Union is provided by Russia, and 80% of that gas flows through Ukraine. The crisis ended on January 19, following negotiations between the then Prime Minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin and the then Prime Minister of Ukraine Julia Timoshenko. It was agreed that in 2009 Ukraine would pay 20% lower price for the Russian gas than its market value, and from 2010 would pay the same price as other European countries, i.e. 470 USD per 1000 cubic meters. Until then, Ukraine had a preferential price for Russian gas of 179,5 USD per 1000 cubic meters (Mileski, 2014: 51).

Generally speaking, before the Riga Summit, the Alliance pointed to the issue of energy security rather unclearly, that is, NATO's activities were aimed at preventing the disruption of the flow of vital resources. Defining the disruption is the key challenge for the Alliance illustrating the gap in the consensus between

military threats to vital resources and those politically motivated. NATO's mandate defined in the Riga Declaration provides some clarification of the interests of the Alliance and their focus on security of energy infrastructure but not on other dimensions of energy security. The focused and limited agenda defined by the Riga Declaration set the stage for official talks in 2007 and early 2008. The then NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, reiterated that the Alliance considered energy security a "collective" challenge for which "collective" response had to be ensured. A response, which would be broadly in line with coordination between national governments and international organizations. Furthermore, NATO's role in such a collective response would be focused where it could contribute, that is, the Alliance should consider its own role in protecting delivery routes, especially in case of transport of liquefied natural gas with offshore vessels and critical energy infrastructure protection when there is a certain high level of threat.

At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the same approach was confirmed. The Alliance will endeavour to contribute and fully coordinate with the activities of the international community, which contain numerous organizations that specialize in the field of energy security. Although there are still some obscure phrases – the Alliance will engage in "projecting stability" and promote international and regional cooperation. Moreover, the focus on civil defence and crisis management and energy infrastructure remains clear. This leads us to consideration of the "deepened" role that NATO could realize.

In this context, NATO's role could be geared towards contributing to coordinated international efforts to improve energy security in two broad areas: information sharing and planning, and response.

Firstly, information sharing is one of the key principles of energy security. NATO can contribute by acting as an important bridge between the energy and security community. This is clearly indicated by the Riga Declaration, and confirmed by the Bucharest Declaration, that is, NATO can contribute to the exchange of information acting as a forum for exchange of notifications. Certain considerations are moving in the direction of strengthening the link between the security and energy community through the creation of permanent monitoring and evaluation of the action mechanisms in cooperation with the International Energy Agency (IEA) and similar organizations, including companies. In addition, NATO can contribute to the exchange of data through the practical use of its assets and capacities. That is, marine surveillance and early warning assets can be used to provide immediate information on major maritime transport routes that are not sufficiently covered by the national capacities of certain countries. Secondly, the Alliance can contribute to the achievement of energy security by making available its own military capabilities and expertise where needed. Primarily it is referred to physical protection, patrolling and escorting the critical infrastructure pathways. NATO already has a clearly defined role in protecting oil and gas facilities in the North Sea in case of armed attacks. NATO's (and the EU's) naval capacities are already used to protect shipments of oil and gas in the Horn of Africa and West Africa region, especially from pirate attacks and terrorist attacks. Such threat response capabilities were manifested by operation Steadfast Jaguar 06, held in Cape Verde in June 2006.

Energy security has an appropriate position in NATO's new Strategic Concept of 2010, adopted at the NATO Summit held in Lisbon. As a continuation of the above mentioned paragraphs, in the part of the strategic framework that positions the concept for critical infrastructure protection of NATO, in Article 13 of the basic principles and principles of the new Strategic Concept of NATO, it is emphasized that all countries increasingly rely on vital communications, transport and transit routes dependent on international trade, energy security and prosperity. This implies greater international efforts to ensure their resistance to attacks or interruptions. Certain NATO Member States will increasingly become dependent on external energy suppliers, while in certain cases by external energy suppliers and distribution networks for their own needs. On a global level, the energy supply will face increased exposure to disruption in distribution. (Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the NATO)

These commitments represent the continuity of NATO's attitudes set forth in the Strategic Concept adopted in 1999. It is evident that it forms the basis for all further decision-making processes by the Alliance, and everything related to energy security. Paragraph 24 of this Strategic Concept enacted on NATO's 50th anniversary in Washington, states: "Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind".

So, NATO Member States agree with consensus that terrorist attacks could be the basis for invoking the collective security guarantees contained in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Up to 1999, the Clinton Administration dealt with the bombings of US embassies and military forces abroad by Al-Qaeda, and urged the Allies to agree on extending the traditional concept and the reason for activating Article 5. Two years later, with the September 11, 2001 attacks, following the horrific scenes of the terrorist attacks on Twin Towers, a North-Atlantic Council statement followed, stating that the Council agreed that if determined that this attack against the United States was conducted from abroad, it would result in the activation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, stating that an armed attack against one of the Allies in Europe or North America will be considered an attack against them all. The collective self-defence effort embodied in the Washington Treaty for the first time faced situations different from those that existed before, but it still remains no less valid and essential.

What should be noted is that Paragraph 24 of the Strategic Concept does not end and does not cover only the "terrorist act". Furthermore, violations of the course of vital resources constitute an additional basis for invoking Article 4 and even a coordinated response (if necessary) through collective security in accordance with

Article 5. This does not mean that there is an automatic response mechanism if such situations arise. The existence of this paragraph does not mean that any oil crisis will result in invoking Article 5 by NATO. This will depend above all on the nature of the circumstances, the success / failure of diplomatic measures, but also the ability to reach consensus within NATO.

Regarding the Lisbon Declaration, the content in the field of energy security is highlighted in Article 41. Namely, the Article points out that the stable and secure energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, as well as the connection to energy networks, remains to be of critical importance. The Alliance will continue consultations on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security in line with the decisions taken at previous summits and in line with the new Strategic Concept from Lisbon. The Alliance will further develop capacities to contribute to energy security, concentrating on the areas discussed at the Bucharest Summit. In advancing the work of the Alliance, cooperation and consultations with partners and other international actors will be strengthened in order to integrate energy security considerations in NATO policies and activities. It will be requested to prepare an interim report on the progress achieved in the area of energy security for the Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 2011, and a further report for consideration at the forthcoming NATO Summit (Lisbon Summit Declaration, 2010).

At the Chicago Summit, the continuity of interest in energy security remains. In a Declaration emerging from the Chicago Summit, Article 52 states, same as the previous Summit in Lisbon, that a stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations concerned, NATO closely follows relevant developments in energy security. At the Chicago Summit, NATO noted a progress report, which outlines the concrete steps taken since the last Summit of the Alliance and describes the way forward to integrate, as appropriate, energy security considerations in NATO's policies and activities. NATO will continue to consult on energy security and further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. To this end, it is noted that for the aforementioned goals, the Alliance will work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of own military forces; develop own competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and further develop own outreach activities in consultation with partners, on a case-by-case basis. On this occasion, the Alliance welcomes the offer to establish a NATO-accredited Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania, as a contribution to NATO's efforts in this area. The Council's task is to continue to refine NATO's role in energy security in accordance with the principles and the guidelines agreed at the Bucharest Summit and the direction provided by the new Strategic Concept as well as the Lisbon decisions. The Council is tasked to produce a further progress report for the next NATO Summit (Chicago Summit Declaration, 2012).

At the NATO Summit held in Cardiff, Wales in 2014, the final declaration of the Summit in Article 109 mentions the following: For NATO of critical importance and

permanent commitment are constant and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, as well as the interconnectivity of energy networks. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organizations, NATO closely follows relevant developments in the field of energy security, including in relation to the Russia-Ukraine crisis and the growing instability in the Middle East and North Africa region. NATO will continue to consult on and further develop its own capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. In particular, the awareness of energy developments with security implications for Allies and the Alliance is especially emphasized; further develop NATO's competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and engagement in improving the energy efficiency of military forces, with the Green Defence Framework highlighted (Wales Summit Declaration, 2014).

The Green Defence Framework is a significant step forward that was made at the Cardiff Summit. In short, this Framework provides the basis for increased knowledge sharing and coordination of research that can support the development of cheaper and more efficient green solutions for defense capabilities and deal with a range of modern and emerging security challenges such as energy security, global climate change, defense expenditure and logistic challenges to gaining energy on the battlefield (Larsen, 2015).

In 2016, the host of the NATO Summit was Poland, that is, Warsaw. The final declaration of the Summit in Article 135 emphasises that energy development and movement can have significant political and security implications for the Alliance, as demonstrated by the crises to NATO's east and south. It is concluded that a stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of import routes, suppliers and energy resources, as well as the interconnectivity of energy networks are of critical importance for NATO. Reaching these commitments will allow for increased resilience against political and economic pressure. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national governments and other international organisations, NATO closely follows the security implications of relevant energy developments and attaches particular importance to diversification of energy supply in the Euro-Atlantic region. For these reasons, it is underlined that NATO will continue to further enhance its own strategic awareness in this regard, including through sharing intelligence and through expanding own links with other international organisations such as the International Energy Agency and the EU. In doing so, it will be of particular importance to consult and share information on energy security issues of particular concern to Allies and the Alliance, with a view to providing a comprehensive picture of the evolving energy landscape, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value. NATO will also continue to develop its own capacity through energy security considerations in training, exercises, and advance planning. The main objective is to support national authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, as well as enhancing their resilience against energy supply disruptions that could affect national and collective defence, including hybrid and cyber threats. NATO's commitment will be to further improve the energy efficiency of military forces through establishing common standards, reducing dependence on fossil fuels, and demonstrating energy-efficient solutions for the military.

A progress report on NATO's role in energy security was noted at the Warsaw Summit (Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 2016).

At the last NATO Summit held in Brussels in 2018, the official final declaration states that energy security plays an important role in common security. At the same time, the allegations from the previous summit are reiterated that a stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, as well as the interconnectivity of energy networks are crucial and increase the Alliance's resilience against political and economic pressure. While these issues are primarily the responsibility of national authorities, energy development can have significant political and security implications for the Allies, and will also affect NATO partners. As a result, NATO will continue with regular consultations with the Allies on issues related to energy security. It is especially emphasized that it is essential to ensure that members of the Alliance are not vulnerable to political or forced manipulation with energy, which is a potential threat. Therefore, the Allies will continue to seek diversification of their energy reserves, in accordance with their needs and conditions. NATO will mitigate its own role in energy security in accordance with established principles and guidelines and will continue to develop NATO capacity to support national authorities in protecting critical infrastructure, including against malicious hybrid and cyber activities. NATO will continue to further enhance its own strategic awareness, through sharing intelligence and expanding own links with relevant international organisations such as the International Energy Agency, International Renewable Energy Agency and the EU, as appropriate. NATO will also improve the energy efficiency of military forces, through the use of sustainable energy sources, when appropriate. These assertions indicate that between the two NATO Summits in Warsaw and Brussels the directions of NATO's action in the area of energy security and critical infrastructure protection have not changed (Brussels Summit Declaration, 2018).

The continuing interest of the Alliance for the protection of critical (energy) infrastructure is a constant that can be recognized from the guidelines that emerge from the Summits' final Declarations. From them, it is clear that preparation of reports by the North Atlantic Council for the advancement of the Alliance in the field of critical infrastructure protection and energy security is required.

3.3. Critical Review of the Complex Role of the Alliance

According to the foregoing, NATO is mandated to re-examine its potential role in the field of energy security, internationally. The Riga Declaration, in particular the section on energy security, faces a series of complex elements that slow down the practical definition of the role of the Alliance. Officials and analysts from most NATO Member States are of the opinion that energy security remains a national problem, and that it should be treated as such. Therefore, according to them, deployment of NATO troops on oil platforms or safeguarding oil pipelines and gas pipelines is unthinkable scenario. In this context, a NATO diplomat responding to speculation about the deployment of troops as "pipeline police" in regions such as the Caucasus, will emphasize that energy security and safety of installations and transport routes constitute a national responsibility. The engagement of the

Alliance should primarily focus on giving advice and assistance rather that actively engaging on the field. (Mileski, 2014: 56).

Turkish experts and analyst's express similar views pointing out that by fighting against the Kurds, the Turkish state made much more than the Alliance in terms of protecting critical energy infrastructure. Also, Azerbaijan, where a significant energy route passes (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline) via former Deputy Prime Minister Abid Sharifov emphasizes that the Alliance has no experience in protecting pipelines and communications that pass through non-NATO countries. Such views on the lack of need for assistance by NATO, specifically for the indicated oil pipeline, arise from the fact it is protected by both the Azerbaijani government and companies that believe that protection has been achieved through other measures such as: deep digging of oil pipelines and the indication of the locals for the importance of the pipelines safety.

On the other hand, if we move to the north, more precisely the North Atlantic region, and analyze the discussions of their experts and analysts we will see different standpoints. Namely, the Norwegian Sea and the transport routes of oil and natural gas that pass through here, promote discussions on the need to consider maritime safety issues. It is underlined that NATO Members from both sides of the Atlantic must work together on energy security, as a central part of the Alliance's security policy, primarily on transport security and then on energy security. According to Bjorn Bjarnarssonar, energy security poses a new dimension that redefines the northern areas of the Atlantic region of NATO's political and military scene, that is, reaffirms NATO's maritime identity.

According to other opinions, the energy security role would divert or violate the NATO agenda to the detriment of existing missions. Energy security is also linked to other issues of the complex NATO agenda, such as the debate on further extension of Article 5 including energy security. In his speech on the side-lines of the Summit in Riga, already mentioned Senator Lugar suggested effective energy strategies to include new relations with the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and in particular the relations with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, where possible NATO membership must be put on the table (Mileski, 2014: 59).

Arguments for the extension of Article 5 concern the possibility of destroying national economies if energy is used as a "weapon". In this way, the Alliance would commit itself to an appropriate response to the attempts and use of energy as a "weapon" against its Member States.

Although cooperation with other international organizations is an important intention noted in Riga, Lisbon, Chicago, Cardiff, Warsaw and Brussels, it is also proving to be quite problematic. Defining NATO's role within energy security allows wider discussion and presentation of different opinions that are often at the same "frequency". This can be illustrated, for example, with the difference in defining the threats to energy security at national and institutional level. Taking into account the different geographical regions, resources and infrastructure capacities, and therefore their individual energy strategies, most countries in the EU and NATO see a different way of the energy situation. Accordingly, within each organization, there is a problem of defining any advanced degree of clarification and consensus on the nature of the threat and to whom it relates.

A growing number of EU and NATO Member States regard the energy crisis as an economic problem that should be primarily regulated on the market, rather than by external political and security measures. Generally, we could agree that the United States is striving to accept energy security as a protection of energy supplies, while the EU defines it in terms of managing energy demand. These different starting points in the definition of energy issues pose an additional complicated situation, especially after the various reactions within the EU and NATO on some of the issues that brought energy security to the agenda of the Alliance. All this undermines the prospect of establishing complementary energy relations between NATO and the EU.

An additional problem is the Russian view of the discussions on the inclusion of energy security on the NATO agenda. The Alliance is striving the debate on energy security not to be interpreted by Moscow as an anti-Russian signal. In this regard, the statement of the Russian Foreign Minister at the end of 2007, Sergey Lavrov, is especially interesting. Namely, he condemned the politicization of energy security to the detriment of the producer countries and stressed that what is purely economic is politicized by an attempt to unite consumers to confront the Russian energy monopoly (Monaghan, 2008). As NATO begins to discuss energy as a security issue, Moscow is also doing the same, compiling a new military doctrine in which energy security has its place. In particular, in the new military doctrine of Russia from 2014, in the part of carrying out the main tasks of building and developing the armed forces and other troops and organs, among other things, they are achieved by establishing territorial troops for protection and defense of military, governmental and special facilities, that provide vital functions of the population, operation of transport, energy facilities, as well as objects that pose an increased danger to the life and health of people (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2014).

In the process of redefining NATO as a security guarantor for its Members, the need for a serious consideration of the energy supplies safety is increasingly required. The threats to energy security are widely established in international politics, but also at the national level. In addition, the problem is seriously elaborated in the academic community as well. However, the positions that are not related to the acceptance of NATO's role in resolving threats to energy security are still dominant.

As for the existing grounds of the Alliance, regarding Article 5, we can see that energy security is somehow contained in it. Article 4 of the Washington Treaty stipulates that the Parties "will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened". Article 5 is also potentially relevant, taking into account the nature of most threats "the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them" (The North Atlantic Treaty). Taking into account the fact that this does not distance the energy plants from other targets, and on the other hand the nature of the threats to energy infrastructure by terrorists, pirates and even countries, most likely will take the form of armed attacks, we can assume that an armed attack on an energy plant may be the reason for invoking Article 5. The only exception

would be the deliberate termination of production of the necessary quantities of fuels and their delivery to the end consumers, which would influence national economies and would have taken certain political positions the country of origin. In this case, the reference to Article 5 would be indicative.

Negative connotations regarding the proposed agenda for NATO's role in energy security seem to be understood too simplified. That is, speculations generally go in the direction solely of military response of the Alliance in case of endangering energy security. If this is followed up by the unrealistic agenda or the provocation for discussion on changing the existing Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the potential membership of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, a new strategic horizon is evident which can shape the future international context in which the Alliance will function.

In defining its own role within energy security, the Alliance faces two parallel debates aimed at defining the disruption of energy supply. Will it be a military disruption, caused by armed attacks or perhaps in the context of a competition for access to certain resources? It should determine the efforts of the Alliance in order to find the most appropriate solutions. That is, its engagement would work in the direction of cooperation with partners, capacity building, defense reform and training of partner countries. In extreme cases, it may be possible to include military infrastructure protection against armed attacks. The second debate is aimed at determining the disruption of energy supply due to political reasons for such an act, which are often difficult to define and prove. In this case, it is very difficult to count on the consensus of all partners in eventual undertaking of certain measures. On the other hand, such a situation can motivate consideration of certain solutions within the Alliance, which might be the intention to improve its own efficiency in energy consumption as a means of reducing dependence on external conditions.

However, the Alliance will have to work more actively on its own role in energy security, in the context of its evolving path of survival and functioning on the international security scene. One of these directions seems to have established itself with the establishment of the NATO accredited Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Lithuania. This act clearly shows that energy security debates from theoretical elaborations, slowly but surely, result in practical actions on the ground. Namely, the Centre started functioning in 2012 as an international military organization under NATO's mentorship. With this act, the role of NATO in the field of energy security is more clearly determined. The concept for this Centre is in line with the set strategy for the so-called NATO's "smart defense", established at the Lisbon Summit. The Centre will work in the field of technical, scientific and academic research that should contribute to the appropriate assessments and analyses of the contingency risks. The Centre should also contribute through appropriate recommendations and suggestions for effective and cost-effective solutions to operational energy problems in support of military requirements. The Centre should support the research of alternative energy resources and the development of environmentally friendly and efficient military capabilities. Furthermore, it should facilitate engagement in education and exercises, as well as provide scientific, technical and academic analyses from various aspects of energy supply and critical energy infrastructure (NATO ENSEC COE).

We will specify several examples on how the Alliance should be set in case of potential energy crises. According to certain scenarios that are hypothetical, but not impossible, a NATO Member State may request additional consultations in accordance with Article 4, and as a result of endangering the security of energy supply. For example, in January 2006, Bulgaria (a NATO member since 2002) rejected Gazprom's request to re-examine the price it should pay for natural gas. If Gazprom cut off the natural gas supply to Bulgaria (as it happened with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia), the question arises as to whether Bulgaria would seek additional consultations under Article 4. The only way to find out the answer to such a question is to bring it out within NATO. In addition, Bulgaria is not the only NATO member with very high dependence on imported oil or natural gas. What is more, Slovakia 100% dependency, the Baltic States with 100% dependency, Poland with 99% dependency, Bulgaria with 94% dependency, Czech Republic with 82% dependency and Hungary with 81% dependency are in a similar situation (Bell, 2009: 266).

Ukraine is not a NATO member, at least not until today. On NATO's 60th anniversary in 2009, Poland and the United States strongly urged its accession to the Alliance. However, regardless the timeframe about favouring Ukrainian membership in NATO, it is difficult to imagine how NATO Allies will adhere to the Alliance's Strategic Concept, if, after the eventual Ukrainian membership, Russia decides to stop the supply of gas again. Similar concerns exist for Georgia (which also aspires to join NATO). A recent military conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 underscored the risk of including former Russian Allies (who play a key role in energy security) in the Alliance. If Georgia were a NATO member, Russia's 2008 assault would put the Alliance under pressure to fulfil its military commitments. Emphasis is placed on Iran and the current nuclear crisis that is taking place there.

The European Union and the United States have stressed that they will never allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. Speculation about a possible preventive war aimed at Iran's nuclear facilities is becoming increasingly louder. However, at the same time, measures have been taken by the UN Security Council, but also by the United States and the European Union, mainly expressed through economic sanctions, which seek to force Iran to finally stop its nuclear program. However, the Iranian Government made it clear that any more rigorous measures towards Iran adopted by the UN Security Council would result in a reduction or total stoppage of Iranian oil exports to Western countries. Any obstruction of the transit of oil through the Ormut Strait will result in catastrophic consequences for many world economies. The events on the Arctic will also be interesting. Due to global warming, the vast oil and gas resources in that part of the world will finally become available (it is assumed that the Arctic possesses 25% of the total oil and gas reserves), and even 4 NATO Member States (the USA, Norway, Denmark and Canada), but Russia as well, will be direct participants as well as competitors for access to these resources. So, in conditions of incomplete defining of NATO's position on energy security, the only way to find out what is going to happen in the future is to go with the flow on the events that are ahead of us, and the answers will come by themselves. After the attacks on Iraq by the Allies, it became clear that

NATO would play the key role in dialogue for strategic and political consultations and coordination between the Allies from Europe and North America. In the future, it is assumed that this partnership will be strengthened, and dialogue will be further intensified, as well as the need for political and security consultations and coordination at the highest level in the Alliance, as there will be few issues that will be more important than energy security. The most likely source of armed conflicts in the European area and the surrounding regions in the future will be the lack of fuels and manipulation with them. Therefore, it is logical to assume that NATO Member States will be increasingly engaged in missions that are directly or indirectly related to energy security. If the Alliance wants to preserve its role and continue to be relevant to the development of global security in the mid-21st century, it will have to clarify its position and continue its coordination with other governmental and non-governmental organizations towards the realization of a common and a comprehensive transatlantic energy security policy. In other words, NATO should also use its status as an intergovernmental organization, but also its comparative advantage over other international organizations and that is its military capability.

Chapter conclusion

Analyzing NATO's Strategic Concepts, we can immediately assume that the Alliance regulates and protects its critical infrastructure. A wide range of opportunities and scenarios for NATO's involvement in protecting critical infrastructure gives the impression that at some points the militaristic approach is far beyond the Alliance's strategic commitments. However, the dilemmas that have been analyzed, related to the field of energy security and energy critical infrastructure, do not yet give a precise answer whether the energy sphere is purely an economic issue and whether energy issues can solely be regulated with military force. In this regard, NATO's emphasis should be placed on the support of national authorities, their strengthening and support for the successful and effective protection of critical infrastructure. The debate over the change of Article 5 and the explanation for the collective security of the Member States is more a form of strengthening the efforts to involve the Alliance in operational actions for concrete involvement in practice.

Analyzes by relevant authorities say the main responsibility for energy security issues should be left to the European Union, and NATO should stay aside. The European Union has a key role that it can and must play. This primarily concerns the activation of the necessary diplomatic measures towards Russia and the maximization of efforts to ensure Russian ratification of the Energy Charter and its transport protocols. In addition, intensification of efforts to define energy security within the European Union is needed, as well as new initiatives aimed at creating a single European energy market, resolving market disruptions, encouraging diversification and developing new technologies, and initiating programs to protect the European critical infrastructure. The European Union can and must expand its dialogue and cooperation with the United States in the field of energy security. Nevertheless, Norway and Turkey (still) are not members of the European Union,

which means that at the meetings of EU ministers, no one officially represents the North Sea oil supply, nor the possibility of reducing European dependence on Russian oil and gas represented by the realization of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (Bell, 2009: 267).

The EU-US dialogue does not include Canada, leaving another country with huge resources away from these processes. However, these three countries (Norway, Canada and Turkey) are members of NATO and they exist as equal partners within. So, coordination between NATO and the European Union will be a winning combination for both sides. If anything, the dialogue (both at the informal level and in the regular meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the European Union Political Security Committee) is inevitable on issues related to the protection of critical infrastructure. Dialogue can be accomplished in many other places, especially within the OSCE, but also in the G-8 (Russia was chair in 2007, and the then President Putin imposed energy security as a key topic for discussion). The NATO-Russia Council is another place where political dialogue on these issues can be realized. The Council is not intended exclusively for talks for which there is agreement between the two Parties. It is also a place where all the issues with deep disagreements are expressed, and all the views of the Euro-Atlantic Allies about Russian energy use as an instrument of foreign policy should be presented here.

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